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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
:

Case No. 20081068

APPELLEE/PETITIONER,
v.
SUSAN TRIPP,

(not incarcerated)

APPELLANT/RESPONDENT.

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
Article VIII § of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a)
and (5) provide this Court's jurisdiction over the State's timely filed petition.1

ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION
1. Did the court of appeals apply the correct legal standard in assessing
voluntariness of consent?
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference
for correctness. See, e.g., Newman v. White Water Whirlpool. 2008 UT 79,1J6, 197 P.3d
654.
This issue was addressed in pages 10-13 of the State's petition for certiorari.

1

The court of appeals filed the Tripp opinion on October 30, 2008. This Court
granted the State's motion to extend the time for filing its certiorari petition to December
31, 2008. The State filed its petition on December 31, 2008.

2. If necessary, should this Court affirm the court of appeals' consent analysis on
the alternative bases that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous and
incomplete and legal conclusions were incorrect, and/or on the alternative basis that any
consent was tainted by Tripp's illegal arrest?
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference
for correctness. See, e ^ , Newman v. White Water Whirlpool 2008 UT 79, ^|6, 197 P.3d
654.
Tripp raised the underlying arguments in the court of appeals. See, e.g.. Opening
Brief of Appellant at 7-23, Reply Brief of Appellant at 1-10, On certiorari, this Court has
full authority to affirm the court of appeals on alternative grounds. See, e.g.. State v.
Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, If 18, 123 P.3d 407.
3. Did the court of appeals err in assessing probable cause in addressing the State's
argument that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw?
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference
for correctness. See, e ^ , Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79,1J6, 197 P.3d
654.
This issue was addressed in pages 13-15 of the State's petition for certiorari.
4. Did the court of appeals err in its assessment of the State's inevitable discovery
argument?
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference
for correctness. See, e ^ , Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, ^[6, 197 P.3d

654.
This issue was addressed in pages 15-17 of the State's petition for certiorari.

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Copies of the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution are in
the addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1), and with failure to yield the right of way, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-72.10(3) (R. 2-3). The
magistrate presided over the preliminary hearing and ordered Tripp bound over as
charged (R. 32-33).
Tripp moved to suppress evidence, the State opposed the motion, and Tripp replied
(R. 36-58; 65-125; 126-44). Judge Kennedy presided over an evidentiary hearing and
heard oral argument before denying the motion to suppress (R. 157-62).
Following the trial, the jury convicted Tripp as charged (R. 299). Judge Kennedy
sentenced Tripp to concurrent terms of zero to five years in prison and ninety days in jail,
but then suspended that sentence and required her to serve three hundred and sixty days in

2

jail as a condition of probation (R. 397-400, 403).
Tripp filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 409). The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for a new trial or other
proceedings. State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, 197 P.3d 99.
The State petitioned for certiorari and Tripp opposed the petition. This Court
granted the petition.

RELEVANT FACTS2
Tripp stopped at the stop sign on the Old Bingham Highway and was driving her
truck across U-111 at the intersection, when a motorcycle driven by Daniel Pracht, which
was headed south on U-111, slid underneath and into the rear end of her truck (R. 525:
346).3 Pracht later died from his injuries sustained in the crash (R. 533: 9). The road
Pracht was driving on is hilly, and dips three eights of a mile prior to the intersection (R.
533: 59-60). The road configuration or Tripp's own doorpost could have blocked her
view of Pracht's motorcycle as she entered the intersection (R. 533: 60).
At the time of the collision, Pracht may have been speeding, and this may have

2

These facts include those about the circumstances of the accident and the potential
causes thereof, as they pertain to the issue of probable cause underlying the exigent
circumstances and inevitable discovery analysis.
3

The State's assertion that Tripp pulled out and collided with Pracht may
inadvertently give the incorrect impression that she hit him with the front of her car. See
State's brief at 4.
3

been the cause of the accident. As the trial court recognized, the State's evidence
conflicted regarding whether he should have been driving fifty or sixty miles an hour (T.
526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the right to assume that Pracht
was going the speed limit (R. 533: 60-61). The State's accident reconstructionist
conceded that, due to a lack of underlying data from the police investigation, he would
not purchase stock if his decision were based on information of the same quality as he had
to work with in Tripp's case (R. 526: 516). Nonetheless, he estimated that Pracht was
driving at least 59 miles an hour, and may have been going faster than that (R. 526: 505,
514). He testified that if Pracht had been going fifty miles an hour, Tripp would have
cleared the intersection before Pracht came through, and that there would have been no
accident (R. 526:516).
Pracht's braking error may have caused the accident. The point of impact between
his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within three feet of either
side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the time of the crash
(R. 526: 509). The physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, Pracht was
applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some forty-four feet
prior to sliding underneath and hitting Tripp's truck (R. 525: 355-56, 358, R. 526: 465).
Applying only the rear brake on a motorcycle routinely causes them to lose control and
slide (R. 526: 410, 415). Had Pracht been braking properly, he could have stopped or
steered around Tripp's truck, rather than sliding underneath and colliding with it as he did

4

(R. 532: 37-39).
The police were called immediately to the scene, at 6:53 p.m. (R. 526: 449). The
police did not ask Tripp to perform field sobriety tests (R. 533: 25). Officer Saunders,
who was trained to detect signs of impairment, testified at trial that he performed no field
sobriety tests because he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was impaired, but sought
a blood draw from her as a matter of course, as he does with people in all serious
accidents (R. 525:350, 377).4

4

The State's brief notes that the victim's advocate, Budd, detected the odor of
alcohol from the car Tripp was in prior to being moved to the police car, and then
detected the odor of alcohol from Tripp's person when Tripp was in the police car.
State's brief at 6. The State's brief alleges that Budd informed the police that she smelled
the alcohol, without clarifying that Budd's testimony was that she informed the police of
the odor in the family car Tripp and other adults were in (R. 533: 84). There is no
testimony that she informed the police of the smell she detected coming from Tripp, no
testimony that she informed the police of the odor from the family car at the scene or
later. The State's brief also notes that the blood tech smelled an odor of alcohol from
Tripp (his testimony was that the odor was slight R. 53: 97). There is no evidence that he
detected the odor prior to drawing her blood, or that the police were informed of the odor.
The State's brief alleges that Budd noticed that Tripp slurred her words. State's
brief at 6, citing R 533: 84. This assertion is erroneous. Page 84 of the transcript reflects
this testimony:
Q
Was she able to speak lucidly?
A
Yeah, she was speaking.
Q
I mean, she wasn't slurring her words?
A
I'm not familiar how she speaks but that day I spoke to her, yeah.
(R. 533:84).
Assuming arguendo that this testimony is fairly read as an indication that Tripp
was slurring her speech, there is no evidence that Budd informed the police. In order to
establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support Fourth Amendment intrusions
by the police, the facts must be known to the police. See, e^g., United States v. Stewart,
867 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1989)(considering facts known by the police in assessing
lawfulness of search). Cf., e ^ , State v. Applegate. 2008 UT 63, f 17, 194 P.3d 925
5

The police officers who demanded and ordered that Tripp's blood be drawn
believed that they had a right to do so in that absence of probable cause. Officer
Saunders, who initially ordered Detective Roberts to obtain Tripp's blood, routinely took
blood samples in cases involving serious accidents and believed that this was a lawful
demand for him to make (R. 533: 10, 25, 55). At the time of the blood draw, Detective
Roberts believed that he had the legal right to demand a blood sample from Tripp as a
result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34).
Tripp consented to undergo a urine test, but adamantly refused to submit to a blood
test because she is phobic of needles (R. 533: 65). The police isolated her from her
friends and family, informed her she was in custody and/or under arrest, and demanded
that she submit to the blood test, telling her that they would get a warrant and take her
blood by force if she did not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72).
Perhaps the best indicator of the illegal nature of the arrest is the testimony of
Officer Monson, who frankly conceded that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest
(R. 525:350, 377; R. 533:73).
The victim's advocate tried unsuccessfully to calm Tripp and assuage her fear of
needles, and the blood tech also tried to calm her and paraphrased the DUI admonitions,
mentioning her rights to silence, to counsel, and her right to refuse the test (R. 525: 268,
R. 533: 102).

(reasonableness of detention turns on objective analysis of facts known to the police).
6

During the blood draw, Tripp was in a police car with a police officer outside the
car door and covering Tripp's eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding
one of her hands, and the blood tech right outside the car door holding her other arm
behind her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). While she did extend her arm to the blood tech
prior to the test, this was in response to his telling her that he was going to put the
tourniquet on and see if there was a spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533:
95). The blood tech felt that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to
draw her blood when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found
a spot to draw the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just
go ahead and take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he
stuck the needle in (R. 533: 95). During the blood draw, Tripp was described as terrified,
petrified, crying, and panicked (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). She was pulling away and crying as
they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271).
Tripp's blood, which was drawn at 9:25 (R. 525: 257), showed metabolite of
cocaine and blood alcohol levels of .085 and .089 (R. 525: 305, 309, 319). There was no
scientific means to assess when Tripp took the cocaine or whether the cocaine metabolite
had any impairing effect on Tripp (R. 525: 306, 309). The equipment used to assess
blood alcohol levels is only within six percent of accuracy ninety-six percent of the time
(R. 525: 324).
After denying Tripp's motion to suppress, the trial court admitted the test result on

7

the theory that Tripp's blood draw was voluntary and consensual (R. 157-60). The trial
court instructed the jury that Pracht's negligence could not be considered as a superseding
cause (R. 336).
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress, holding that the blood draw was not consensual. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, fflf
14-17. The court found that the blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances,
given the absence of probable cause. Id. at ^[ 18-22. The court also found that the blood
draw was not exempted from the exclusionary rule by the inevitable discovery doctrine,
because the lack of probable cause did not support the necessary showing that a warrant
would inevitably have issued. Id. at ^f 23-25. Because the court found the blood draw
involuntary, it saw no need to address Tripp's claim that the blood draw was also tainted
by her illegal arrest. Id. at ^f 15. The court did not address Tripp's claims that the trial
court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and incomplete, and conclusions of law
were incorrect. The court of appeals did not address the merits of Tripp's contention that
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of superceding cause. Id. at Tf
12n.5.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Tripp decision does not elevate the government's burden of proof of consent,
or advocate a presumption against consent. Standard Fourth Amendment law requires the
government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "clear and positive testimony
that the consent was unequivocal and freely given." The Tripp decision correctly applied
the law to the evidence, which indicates that the warrantless blood draw was coerced, and
was legally involuntary.
In the event it is necessary to do so, this Court may affirm the conclusion that the
government did not prove consent on the alternative bases of arguments raised by Tripp
in the court of appeals. The trial court's clearly erroneous findings of fact and incorrect
legal conclusions, and/or the taint of Tripp's illegal arrest on any purported consent,
would independently or jointly support a conclusion that there was no legal consent to the
blood draw.
The court of appeals properly assessed the evidence showing the absence of
probable cause to justify a blood draw. Given the absence of probable cause, the court of
appeals correctly ruled that the warrantless blood draw was not sustainable under the
exigent circumstance doctrine. The court similarly correctly recognized that the absence
of probable cause defeated an argument under the inevitable discovery doctrine, because
in the absence of probable cause, no warrant inevitably would have been obtained by the
police. The court's inevitable discovery analysis was correct.

9

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' ANALYSIS OF CONSENT
WAS CORRECT.
A.

The Court of Appeals' Legal Standard Was Correct.

The State argues that in assessing the voluntariness of consent, the court of appeals
applied the incorrect Ham/Villano test,5 which test was overruled in State v. Hansen,
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 and United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1991).
State's brief at 13-16. The Ham test had three prongs:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we]
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived.
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted), abrogated. State
v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, rejected. State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d
1073. The Villano test was essentially the same.6
5

See State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted),
abrogated. State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, rejected. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, 37 P.3d 1073, and Villano v. United States. 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962),
abrogated United States v. Price. 925 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1991).
6

The Villano test was:
"The government must prove that consent was given. It must show that
there was no duress or coercion, express or implied. The consent must be
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.' There must
be convincing evidence that defendant has waived his rights.... ' Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental
10

In Hansen, this Court disapproved of the use of the word "intelligently" in the first
prong of the Ham test, because it implied that the prosecution had the burden to prove
that the person knew of the right to refuse consent. This is not an essential element of
proof for the State, but is merely one factor courts may consider. See Hansen. 2002 UT
125, Tf 54. The Hansen Court rejected the third prong of the Ham test, because there are
no presumptions against waivers of Fourth Amendment rights. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, ^f
55. Similarly, in Price, in overruling Villano. the Tenth Circuit held that the presumption
against waiver would no longer apply in light of the Supreme Court's guidance in
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973), that such presumptions are not
appropriate in the Fourth Amendment context. Price. 925 F.2d at 1271. Just as this
Court's Hansen decision limited only part of the Ham analysis, in Price, the court
expressly indicated that the entire Tenth Circuit was in agreement that the remaining
Villano analysis was still relevant in the voluntariness of consent inquiry. Id. at 1271 and
n.3.
The language in Tripp to which the State objects, which requires the State to prove
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given," is the
same essential test applied by the Tenth Circuit repeatedly since Price. See, e.g.. United
States v. Butler. 966 F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. McNeelv. 6 F.3d

constitutional rights."
310F.2dat684.
11

1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Winningham. 120 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. Zubia-Melendez. 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Guerrero. 472 F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Lyons. 510 F.3d
1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007). It is also the same language applied by state courts in postSchneckcloth opinions. See, e.g., State v. Thompson. 166 P.3d 1015, 776 (Kan. 2007);
and State v. Harris. 642 A.2d 1242, 1247 n.8 (Del. Super. 1993).
The State argues as if the Tripp opinion's language which requires the State to
prove "clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given"
incorrectly elevates the State's burden from a preponderance to a clear and convincing
standard of proof. State's brief at 15. The case upon which the argument relies, A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.. 960 F.2d 1020, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(en banc), is a patent suit involving issues of laches and estoppel. In its discussion of
quantum of proof, the court distinguished between the preponderance of the evidence
standard and the clear and convincing standard. The latter standard applies in cases
where there is a danger of deception, where there is an "important individual interest" at
stake, where a claim is disfavored as a matter of policy, and in certain patent cases. Id. at
1045. In discussing how both standards of proof are at times applied in estoppel cases by
various courts, the court explained that confusion about the applicable standard likely was
attributable to the courts' failure to distinguish between the quantum of proof required
and the substance of the evidence to be proved by that standard - the facts underlying the
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estoppel claim. As the court explained,
[T]he disagreement over the appropriate standard may be more apparent
than real, "because of the failure to distinguish between the quantum or
weight of the evidence and the substance or implication of the evidence
required to establish an equitable estoppel; that is to say, while the facts
relied upon to establish an equitable estoppel must be clear, positive, and
unequivocal in their implication, these facts need not be established by any
more than a fair preponderance of the evidence."
Aukerman, at 1045-46, quoting 28 Am Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 148, 830-31
(1966).
The State's concern regarding the Tripp court's purported elevation of its burden
of proof beyond a preponderance is resolved by distinguishing between the quantum of
proof required, preponderance of the evidence, and the substance of the evidence to be
shown by that standard - clear, positive and unequivocal evidence of consent. See, e.g..
United States v. Arrington, 2008 WL 4459378 at * 3 ("The Government must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was unequivocal, specifically and
intentionally given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion."); United States v.
Romero. 247 Fed. Appx. 955 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The government bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that unequivocal and specific consent was
obtained.").7

7

Copies of these unpublished decisions are in the addendum. The vast majority of
published cases are like Tripp, in identifying the proof the government must show
regarding consent, without specifically identifying the preponderance standard. ISee e.g.,
cases cited on pages 12-13 of this brief, supra.
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Contrary to the State's contentions, the court of appeals did not apply the portions
of the Ham/Villano test which were rejected in Hansen and Price, but instead applied the
Hansen test, while mentioning the valid portions of the Ham/Villano test which are
consistent with portions of Hansen. The court of appeals explained,
We start with consideration of whether Tripp consented voluntarily
to the blood draw. "[C]onsent which is not voluntarily given is invalid."
The appropriate standard to determine whether consent is voluntary "is the
totality of the circumstances test." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^f 56, 63
P.3d 650. "Under the totality of the circumstances test, a court should
carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the characteristics
of the defendant." Id. "Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied.' " '[W]e further look to
see if there is clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal
and freely given.' "Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). In other
words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may his 'capacity for selfdetermination [be] critically impaired.' " Hansen, 2002 UT 125, Tj 57, 63
P.3d 650 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The State, of course, has
the burden of establishing that consent was validly given.
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388 Tf 14 (citations omitted). Particularly when it is read in context,
where it is tied directly to Hansen, the Tripp court's reference to "clear and positive
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given" is not reasonably read as
applying a presumption against waiver. The opinion does not elevate the State's burden
of proof above the preponderance of the evidence standard. Rather, Tripp's analysis is
consistent with standard Fourth Amendment jurisprudence discussed above.
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B.

The Court of Appeals' Correctly Concluded that the State
Failed to Prove Voluntary Consent.

The State contends that the court of appeals should not have found that the
purported consent was obtained by trickery, because the evidence supported the trial
court's finding 15 that Tripp voluntarily extended her arm when the blood tech asked if
she would consent to the blood draw. State's brief at 16-17.
The court of appeals' factual analysis as to trickery is correct. When asked if
Tripp consented to the blood draw, the blood tech testified that Tripp extended her arm to
him prior to the test in response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet
on and see if there was a spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 94-95). The
blood tech felt at that time that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready
to draw her blood when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he
found a spot to draw the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can
just go ahead and take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring
Tripp, he stuck the needle in (R. 533: 95). In contrast, the trial court's finding 15 is
clearly erroneous in reflecting that Tripp extended her arm to the blood tech in response
to his asking if she would consent to the blood draw, and there is no evidence to marshal
in support of this finding.8

8

In the court of appeals, Tripp challenged the trial court's finding to that effect as
being clearly erroneous, because there is no evidence to support it. The State never
contested the argument by identifying one scintilla of evidence to support the finding.
See State's brief in the court of appeals at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenge and
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The State contends that the Tripp opinion suggests that Tripp tried to pull her arm
away to prevent the blood from being taken. The State posits that the court of appeals
instead should have affirmed the trial court's finding that Tripp "never tried to withdraw
her arm and ... never said ; no' or 'stop.'" State's brief at 17.
The Tripp opinion does not suggest that Tripp tried to pull her arm away, but
instead indicates:
The State contends that Tripp's failure to immediately withdraw her
arm must be taken as a clear indication of her consent. We cannot agree.
During the blood draw, Tripp was surrounded by people working for the
State-she was in a police car with an officer outside the door covering her
eyes, a victims' advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands,
and the blood technician outside the car holding her arm where she could
not see it. All the while Tripp was, according to the witnesses, terrified,
crying, and panicked. Given the context of the threat of a forced blood
draw, her arrest by the police, and the presence and participation of the
State's many actors during the blood draw, we cannot say that Tripp
voluntarily consented to have her blood drawn simply because she failed to
retract her arm in the instant between when Davis said "we can go ahead
and [take] care of this"-an ambiguous comment as concerns the timing of
the intended blood draw in any event-and when he inserted the needle.
Indeed, Officer Monson, the officer who witnessed the draw, testified that
although Tripp initially offered her arm to Davis, "[s]he was pulling away,"
and "[s]he was crying. I tried to shield her eyes so [she] wouldn't look at the
needle." The State argues that this is a natural response from someone who
fears needles. We think, however, that given the context of her continuous
refusals to submit to a blood draw, her expressed fear of needles, her arrest,
the threat that she would be forced to provide the blood as soon as a warrant
was obtained, and her crying and pulling away during the blood draw, the
State has failed to meet its burden and to demonstrate that Tripp voluntarily
gave consent under the totality of the circumstances.

indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to
identify any evidence which supports the finding).
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Id. at If 17.
The trial court's finding that Tripp "never tried to withdraw her arm and ... never
said 'no' or 'stop'" is only partially supportable by the evidence from the blood tech that
to his recollection she did not ask him to stop during the draw (R. 533: 95).9 The finding
is incomplete in failing to account for the State's witnesses' testimony that during the
blood draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying, panicked and pulling away as they
secured her (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for the
blood tech's testimony that he could not remember if she said to stop during the blood
draw, but that she was definitely panicked and upset about it (R. 533: 67, 95). Indeed, in
the court of appeals, the State's own brief acknowledged that Tripp was pulling away
during the blood draw. State's brief in the court of appeals at 20.
The State's argues that the court of appeals suggested in paragraph 17, supra, that
Tripp's consent came in response to the police threat to obtain a warrant, despite the
evidence purportedly establishing that the police officer's indication that he would get a
warrant was not a means used to obtain Tripp's consent. State's brief at 17. The "threat
of a forced blood draw" was one fact in the totality of circumstances upon which the court
of appeals relied in rejecting the State's claim that Tripp's failure to withdraw her arm
established voluntary consent. Tripp at ^ 17, supra. The evidence squares with the court
9

The marshaling requirement would be futile if applied to incomplete findings, and
thus does not apply when findings are incomplete. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d
474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991).
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of appeals' presentation of the facts, in demonstrating that the police isolated Tripp from
her friends and family, informed her she was in custody, and demanded that she submit to
the blood test, telling her that they would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she
did not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). The State's argument that the
threat to obtain a warrant was not a "means used to obtain consent" is apparently a
reference to Tripp's failure to immediately agree to a blood draw upon hearing this threat.
The threat, however, was then followed by the police placing her under arrest and in the
police car, and surrounding her with an officer outside the car door and covering Tripp's
eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood
tech right outside the car door holding her other arm behind her as he took her blood
without her permission after leading her to believe that he was only checking for a good
vein (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). The court of appeals properly considered the threat to
obtain a warrant in its totality of the circumstances analysis of whether the blood draw
was the product of coercion or consent. See Hansen, supra.
The State complains of the court of appeals' failure to rely on the fact that the
blood technician reviewed the DUI admonition, and mentioned Tripp's rights to silence,
counsel and to refuse the test prior to the blood draw (R. 533: 102). State's brief at 17-18.
Appellate courts are not required to detail in writing each fact considered by the
courts prior to the issuance of any opinion. See, e.g.. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303
(Utah 1992). Particularly in the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, facts are not to
18

be considered in isolation, but are to be considered in their totality. Cf., ej*., United
States v. Arvisu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002) (in assessing totality of circumstances
supporting reasonable suspicion, courts should not "divide and conquer" each individual
fact in isolation, but should assess the inferences to be drawn by considering the facts as a
whole).
The blood tech's discussion undoubtedly rang rather hollow to Tripp, and did
nothing to contribute to a finding of voluntary consent, given that it came from a blood
tech and occurred after the police had already informed Tripp that she was in custody, not
free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). The legal advice,
coming from a blood tech after the police demanded that she take the test, asserted that
she could not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and threatened to get a warrant and take
her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72), had no
legal effect in the circumstances of this case. The advice was then followed by the blood
draw, which occurred when Tripp was being touched and restrained in a police car by a
police officer and two other state actors, who took her blood without her permission as
she was crying, panicked and pulling away (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). The advice of the
blood tech did nothing to establish that the blood draw was voluntary or consensual. See,
e.g., Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973) ("Conversely, if under all the
circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily-that it was
coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful
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authority-then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable. ").
As is detailed further herein, the State did not and could not meet its burden to
prove voluntary consent. Because the court of appeals' legal standard is correct, and was
properly applied to the facts of Tripp's case, this Court should affirm the Tripp decision.

IL

IF NECESSARY, THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE
COURT OF APPEALS' CONSENT ANALYSIS ON
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS.

On certiorari, this Court has full authority to affirm the court of appeals on
alternative grounds. See, e.g., State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, ^ 18, 123 P.3d 407. The trial
court's clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law, and the taint of the
unlawful arrest of Tripp on any purported consent provide ample alternative bases for
affirmance.

A.

The Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Suppress Was
Clearly Erroneous and Legally Incorrect.
1.

The Findings of Fact Were Clearly Erroneous
and Materially Incomplete.10

The trial court's findings on the motion to suppress now follow, with emphasis
10

The marshaling requirement would be futile if applied to incomplete findings,
and thus does not apply when findings are incomplete. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823
P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991).
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added to those findings that were challenged on appeal. The challenges follow the
quotation of the court's findings.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in
the death of Daniel Pracht.
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that
officers could test her blood if they did not use a needle.
3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on
her fear of needles.
4. When speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using
alcohol or drugs and expressed her fear of needles.
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired
by something.
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared
to lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily.
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they
observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred
speech.
8. The victim advocate, Cecilia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car.
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked
vehicle and secluded from her family and friends because they were
interfering with the investigation.
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective
Roberts' unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the
vehicle, with the door open and her legs outside the vehicle.
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or
shackled.
12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecilia Budd were
present, and neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also
nearby, but he was not in uniform.
21

13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood
draw and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant.
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her
right to counsel and her right to refuse the test.
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the
defendant voluntarily extended her arm.
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to
withdraw her arm and she never said "no" or "stop."
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm
and stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be.
(R. 157-159)(emphasis added).
The trial court's findings are incomplete in failing to acknowledge from the outset
that Officer Saunders, who initially ordered Detective Roberts to obtain Tripp's blood,
routinely took blood samples in cases involving serious accidents and believed that this
was a lawful demand for him to make (R. 533: 10, 25, 55), and that at the time of the
blood draw, Detective Roberts believed that he had the legal right to demand a blood
sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34).The
police officers' mis-perception that they were not required to obtain Tripp's consent or a
warrant, and the fact that the officers made no effort to obtain a warrant, are clearly
relevant to the assessment of the legality of the blood draw. See State v. Rodriguez, 2007
UT 15,fflj53-54, 156 P.3d 711 (recognizing relevance of, and expressing dismay
concerning, officer's failure to know that a warrant should be obtained prior to a blood
draw).
Tripp does not contest the factual accuracy of the trial court's sixth factual finding,
22

that "Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to lack
concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily." He testified that her appearance
when he approached her was "unusual" because her eyes were red, because she was
shaking, and because she seemed nervous (R. 533: 11). He later testified that the more he
talked with Tripp, the more he became concerned that she was impaired because she
appeared to lack concern for Daniel Pracht, because the redness in her eyes was not
dissipating, and because she was constantly smoking (R. 533: 14).
However, the finding is incomplete because it does not account for Detective
Roberts' acknowledgment that shakiness and nervousness would be normal for someone
involved in a fatal car accident (R. 533: 27), the testimony of the State's own witnesses
that Tripp was very upset by the accident and continued crying up to and throughout the
blood draw (R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 82) and that her red eyes were caused by her
crying (R. 533: 70, 77), and the testimony of the victim's advocate that Tripp was
smoking that night in an effort to calm herself (R. 533: 77).
Finding 8 is clearly erroneous in indicating that the victim advocate detected an
odor of alcohol on Tripp when Tripp was in a family car, and there is no evidence to
marshal in support of it. The victim advocate testified that she thought the odor of
alcohol in the family car came from Tripp, but did not know Tripp smelled of alcohol
until Tripp was under arrest and in Detective Roberts' police car, and then did not know if
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the smell came from Tripp's clothing or her mouth (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: 76, 78, 8687).11
Finding 9 is correct in noting that Tripps' family and friends were interfering with
the police investigation, because police testimony reflects that they were telling Tripp she
did not have to submit to a blood draw, and were walking through the accident site (R.
533: 73-74). However, the finding is incomplete in failing to recognize that Tripp was
not just moved to the police car, but was told she was in custody, not free to leave and
was arrested at that juncture after she adamantly refused to submit to the blood test (R.
532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). These facts are key to the issue of the lawfulness of her
arrest and the subsequent blood draw, particularly in light of the testimony of Officer
Saunders that there was no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was impaired, and the
testimony of Officer Monson that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest (R. 525:
350, 377; R. 533:73).
Findings 11 and 12 are accurate in indicating that Tripp was not handcuffed or
shackled, that the blood tech and the victim advocate were present, that Officer Monson
was nearby, and that none of these people was in uniform (e.g. R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270).
However, the findings are incomplete in failing to recognize that these people were

n

In the court of appeals, the State did not contest the clearly erroneous nature of
the trial court's finding of fact 8. Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's
brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenges and indicating it will address them in
its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to identify any evidence which
supports the findings).
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physically restraining Tripp during the blood draw. During the blood draw, Officer
Monson was outside the car door and covering Tripp's eyes, while the victim's advocate
was kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood tech was right
outside the car door holding her other arm behind her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). She was
pulling away and crying as they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271).
Finding 14 is accurate in reflecting that the blood tech reviewed with Tripp her
right to remain silent, her right to counsel, and her right to review the test, because he did
testify that he went over the DUI admonition discussing these rights (R. 533: 102).
However, the finding is incomplete in failing to recognize that this discussion occurred
after the police informed Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest
(R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for
police testimony that prior to the blood tech's discussion of the DUI admonition, the
police demanded that she take the test and told her that she could not refuse to submit to
the blood draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she
did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72).
Finding 15 is clearly erroneous in reflecting that Tripp extended her arm to the
blood tech in response to his asking if she would consent to the blood draw, and there is
no evidence to marshal in support of this finding. When asked if Tripp consented to the
blood draw, the blood tech testified that Tripp extended her arm to him prior to the test in
response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet on and see if there was a
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spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 94-95). The blood tech felt at that
time that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to draw her blood
when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found a spot to draw
the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just go ahead and
take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he stuck the
needle in (R. 533: 95).12
Finding 16 indicates that during the blood draw, Tripp never tried to withdraw her
arm and never said "no" or "stop." The finding is supported by the evidence from the
blood tech that she did not ask him to stop during the draw (R. 533: 95). However, it is
incomplete in failing to account for the State's witnesses' testimony that during the blood
draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying, panicked and pulling away as they secured her
(R. 533: 67, 71, 95). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for the blood tech's
testimony that he* could not remember if she said to stop during the blood draw, but that
she was definitely panicked and upset about it (R. 533: 67, 95).

2.

The Trial Court's Legal Conclusions Were
Incorrect and Materially Incomplete.

12

In the court of appeals, the State did not contest the clearly erroneous nature of
the trial court's finding of fact 15. Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's
brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenges and indicating it will address them in
its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to identify any evidence which
supports the findings).
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The trial court made the following three conclusions of law:
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles,
and the evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the
defendant's fear was resolved.
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw.
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible.
(R. 157-160).
To the extent that the conclusions encompass factual findings, they are clearly
erroneous, because there is no evidence that Tripp's fear of needles was resolved at the
time of the blood draw, or that she voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Rather, the
evidence demonstrates that during the blood draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying,
panicked and pulling away as the blood tech, victim's advocate and police officer secured
her (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). There is no evidence that Tripp ever gave consent to the draw.
Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the blood draw followed the police officers'
telling Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R.
533: 16, 31-32, 73), demanding that she take the test, and instructing her that she could
not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take
her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72).13

13

In the court of appeals, the State did not contest the clearly erroneous nature of
the trial court's finding of fact encompassed in its conclusions of law. Compare Tripp's
opening brief at 8-13 with State's brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenges and
indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to
identify any evidence which supports the findings).
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As the following discussion of law demonstrates, a person's submission to
government threats and physical force does not amount to consent as a matter of law,
particularly when any purported consent follows an illegal arrest.

B.

The Illegal Arrest Tainted Any Purported Consent.
JL

The Arrest and Blood Draw Were Unsupported by Probable Cause.

"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.'" United States v. Stone. 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989).
Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection which is at least coextensive with that of the federal counterpart, in forbidding "sweeping, dragnet-type
detentions of ordinary people engaged in peaceful, ordinary activities. Under both
constitutions, the general rule is that "specific and articulable facts — taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, [must] reasonably warrant the particular intrusion."
State v. DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000). See also id. 996 P.2d at 552
(recognizing that Article I § 14 and numerous provisions of the Utah Declaration of
Rights, consistent with the history of the founders of this State, are concerned with "all
purpose criminal investigation without individualized suspicion.").
In order to justify a warrantless arrest, the government must establish probable
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cause. See, e ^ , State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,fflf34-36, 63 P.3d 650 (police must have
probable cause to arrest); United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir.
2004)(government must prove probable cause to justify arrest). Probable cause is
established if the facts known to the officer and the fair inferences from those facts would
lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed a crime.
State v Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983). Similarly, in order to justify the warrantless
search involved in the blood draw, the government must establish, inter alia, a clear
indication that evidence would be found in the blood draw. See, e.g.. State v. Alvarez,
2005 UT App 145, U 16, 111 P.3d 808 (to justify a warrantless blood draw or other
government search, the government must prove by at least a preponderance of the
evidence "'(A) "a clear indication that evidence would be found"; (B) "exigent
circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion"; and (C) "that the method
chosen was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner.'") (citation omitted).
In the instant matter, the police had no probable cause, but instead arrested Tripp
after she adamantly refused to submit to a blood draw (R. 533: 16, 31-32). They did this
while acting under the incorrect belief that blood draws are routinely taken in serious
accidents (R. 533: 10, 25), and that the police had the legal right to demand a blood
sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34).
Officer Saunders conceded that he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was
impaired or intoxicated, and testified that he sought a blood draw because the accident
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was serious, and he routinely seeks blood draws in such cases and believed he could make
the demand (R. 525: 350, 377). Tripp exhibited no signs of intoxication or impairment
(e.g. R. 525: 387). See Trial Court's finding 7 ("No officer detected the odor of alcohol
on the defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor
balance or slurred speech."). Her red eyes, crying, smoking and nervousness were all
consistent with the facts that she had just been involved in a fatal traffic accident and had
been informed by the police that she had just killed a man and could not refuse their
demand that she submit to a blood draw, which they would force if necessary, despite her
profound fear of needles (e.g. R. 533: 11, 27, 121, 133). Her prolonged crying refutes the
notion that she did not feel bad about the accident ( e ^ R. 532: 14, R. 525: 225, 229).
The fact that she was willing to submit to urinalysis counters the notion that her refusal to
submit to the blood test indicated intoxication (R. 532: 14).
At the time of the arrest and blood draw, the police did not know if Pracht had
been speeding when he ran into the back of Tripp's truck - Detective Roberts conceded
that Pracht may have been going ninety miles an hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35). From
Pracht's skid marks, it appeared that he had braked improperly, in a manner known to
cause the sliding which preceded his collision with Tripp's truck (R. 532: 17, 37). It
appeared from the evidence at the scene that had he not done this, there was ample room
for him to steer around Tripp's truck in the intersection or to stop before colliding with
the truck (R. 532:37, 58-59).
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Perhaps the best indicator of the illegal nature of the arrest is the testimony of
Officer Monson, who frankly conceded that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest
(R. 525: 350, 377; R. 533:73).
The foregoing facts of this case did not establish probable cause to justify Tripp's
arrest, and failed to establish a clear indication that evidence would be found to justify the
blood draw. Compare State v. Worwood. 2007 UT 47,fflj26-36, 164 P.3d 397 (Court
found reasonable suspicion but no probable cause that Worwood was driving under the
influence, given his odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes, and proximity to
crushed beer can, cooler, and large water spot on the road, because his walking and
balance were steady); State v. Rodriguez. 2007 UT 15,fflf3, 57, 59, 156 P.3d 711 (police
had probable cause to justify a warrantless blood draw, where driver made an abrupt left
turn in front of an oncoming school bus, accident was likely to be fatal, defendant had
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and vodka bottle was found at the scene of the
accident); and People v. Roybal 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982) (odor of alcohol emanating
from defendant and collision did not give rise to probable cause, absent evidence that
defendant was responsible for collision).
Because there was no probable cause to justify Tripp's arrest, the arrest violated
the Fourth Amendment and Article I §14, and suppression of all evidence flowing
therefrom is required. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (1963)
(Fourth Amendment violations require suppression). Suppression is also a necessary
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consequence of the violation of Article I § 14. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-71
(Utah I990)(plurality).u Because there was no justification for the blood draw, see,
e.g., Alvarez, supra, the blood test results are independently subject to suppression under
Wong Sun and Larocco, supra.

2.

Particularly Because the Unlawful Arrest Tainted the Blood
Draw, the Warrantless Blood Draw Cannot be Justified on the
Theory of Consent.

The blood draw constituted a search under federal and therefore state
constitutional law. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966),
Larocco, supra. Because there was no warrant, the government bears the burden to
justify the search. See, e^, State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1993 (Utah App. 1991)
(government bears burden to justify warrantless search). In order to justify the
warrantless search of Tripp on the theory of consent, the government must show that the
purported consent was voluntary, and was not the product of the unlawful arrest. E.g.,
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993).

14

While Larocco is a plurality opinion, it is routinely applied as governing law in
this state. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-20 (Utah 1991) (majority of the
Court recognized privacy interest in bank records under Article I § 14, held in accordance
with Larocco that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a violation of Article I § 14,
and that no exceptions had been recognized to the Utah exclusionary rule); State v.
DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) (finding exclusion of illegal checkpoint stop to
be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14); State v. Ziegelman, 905 P.2d 883, 887
(Utah App. 1995) (finding that violation of Fourth Amendment during traffic stop
required suppression under Larocco).
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Utah law consistently recognizes that where purported consent follows an
illegality, the government's burden is substantial. Two factors determine whether consent
to a search is lawfully obtained following police action that violates the Fourth
Amendment, such as the unlawful arrest here: (1) the consent must be voluntary in fact;
and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality.
E.g., Thurman, supra. Both tests must be met in order for evidence obtained in searches
following police illegality to be admissible. Id.
Subsection B of Point I of this brief demonstrates that the court of appeals
correctly held that the blood draw was not consensual. See id- See also Florida v. Rover,
460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)(plurality)("[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission
to a claim of lawful authority."); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)(M Where
there is coercion there cannot be consent."); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106-107
(Utah 1980), supra. Cf. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986) (contrasting
Bumper and stating, "Nor was defendant's consent mere acquiescence to perceived police
authority.").
The government bears a particularly heavy burden in seeking to establish consent
following a preceding illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). In
assessing the government's proof on this issue, the Court should consider "the totality of
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the circumstances surrounding the defendant's consent, focusing on: the temporal
proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, any intervening circumstances, and
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the officer's unlawful conduct." United States
v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 818 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992). Whether
the officer informed the suspect of her right to refuse consent or to leave are significant
factors in the equation. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1994).
Where only minutes pass between the illegal police activity and the purported consent,
and where there are no intervening circumstances, a finding of voluntary consent is
generally not appropriate. See id. at 883. See also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d
558, 562 (10th Cir. 1994)(government must prove both that consent was voluntary, and
that there was a break in the events between the consent and the preceding illegality;
finding that failure to inform defendant of rights to leave and rights to refuse consent
point to involuntary consent).
Assuming arguendo that the government could prove that Tripp's consent were
voluntary, the consent was temporally proximate to and part of her illegal arrest and
continuing detention. The only arguably attenuating factor was the blood tech's
reviewing the DUI admonition, and mentioning Tripp's rights to silence, counsel and to
refuse the test (R. 533: 102). This discussion, coming from the blood tech, undoubtedly
rang rather hollow to Tripp, given that the discussion occurred after the police informed
Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16,
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31-32, 73), and that the discussion followed the police demand that she take the test and
telling her that she could not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and that the police would
get a warrant and take her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533:
28, 35, 71-72). Particularly where the blood was drawn when Tripp was physically
surrounded and restrained by the police and their agents, after the blood tech tricked her
into surrendering her arm on the pretense that he would only check to see if there were a
suitable vein (R. 533: 95), his admonition to her did not attenuate the blood draw from the
preceding illegalities, but rather, aggravated them. Tripp was not informed that she was
free to leave, but was instead informed that she was in custody, not free to leave and
under arrest, and that the police would take her blood by force and get a warrant if she did
not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). The police were not acting in an effort
to comply with the Fourth Amendment, but instead, were flagrantly intent on violating it,
by taking Tripp's blood by force, trickery or any other means necessary (R. 525: 10, 25,
R. 532: 23, R. 533: 33-34). These facts demonstrate that any purported consent by Tripp
was tainted by and part of the ongoing violations of Tripp's constitutional privacy rights.
See, e.g.. Brown and Fernandez, supra.
Because the warrantless search cannot be justified under the theory of consent,
suppression is required by Wong Sun and Larocco, supra.
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III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE ESTABLISHING EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE BLOOD DRAW WAS
CORRECT.

A. There was No Probable Cause to Establish Exigent Circumstances, or to
Demonstrate that a Warrant Inevitably Would Have Been Discovered.
The State claims that the court of appeals erred in its factual assessment of
probable cause by reviewing only those facts which undermined, rather than supported,
probable cause. State's brief at 23. Appellate courts are not required to detail in writing
each fact considered by the courts prior to the issuance of any opinion. See, e ^ , State v.
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992). Particularly in the "totality of the circumstances"
analysis, facts are not to be considered in isolation, but are to be considered in their
totality. Cf., e ^ , United States v. Arvisu. 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002) (in assessing
totality of circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion, courts should not "divide and
conquer" each individual fact in isolation, but should assess the inferences to be drawn by
considering the facts as a whole).
The State first attempts to minimize the involvement of Officers Monson and
Saunders, who testified that they observed no evidence that Tripp was under the
influence. State's brief at 24. Monson spoke to Tripp from a distance of two feet and
noticed no odor of alcohol, was present when Detective Roberts was discussing the blood
draw with her, and tried to shield her eyes as she was terrified and pulling away during
the blood draw (R. 525: 199 205, R. 533: 67). He saw nothing unusual in the way she
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spoke and saw no balance problems or other indicia of impairment as she walked from
the family car to the police car (R. 525: 206-07, R. 533: 69-70). He did not request any
field sobriety tests (R. 525: 207-08).
Officer Saunders was the officer who took Tripp's license and talked with her for a
couple of minutes about the fact that she was the driver in the accident and about how she
did not see Pracht until she saw him sliding in her rear view mirror (R. 525: 334). He was
standing two feet from her and asked her if she had consumed any drugs or alcohol, and
after she said no, he did not suspect otherwise or request field sobriety tests because he
saw no evidence that she was under the influence (R. 525: 335-336, 376-78, 387). He
asked her if she would submit to a blood test to rule out the possibility, and she declined,
saying she was afraid of needles (R. 533: 45). He then asked her to submit to a UA, and
she agreed to do that (R. 533: 45). He explained to her that he wanted the test to confirm
that she had not consumed anything, and to rule out that possibility (R. 533: 47). He also
gave her some forms to complete later (R. 533: 46), but could not recall having done so at
the time of trial (R. 525: 337-38). After assessing the physical evidence from the
accident, which indicated that Tripp had pulled out in front of Pracht, Saunders testified
that he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was under the influence of anything (R.
525: 350). He testified that nothing he saw or heard led him to believe she had consumed
anything, and that she was not slurring her words (R. 533: 46, 53). He told Officer
Roberts that he did not see or smell anything (R. 533: 52). The State's efforts to
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minimize the opportunities these officers had and took to observe Tripp should be
rejected on the basis of the record discussed above.
The State complains of the court of appeal's failure to account for Detective
Roberts' testimony that he became progressively more concerned that Tripp was impaired
as his investigation proceeded, and the trial court's sixth finding:
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipale with time, she was nervous, she appeared
to lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily.
See State's brief at 24-26.
As an initial matter, finding 6 is incomplete because it does not account for
Detective Roberts' acknowledgment that shakiness and nervousness would be normal for
someone involved in a fatal car accident (R. 533: 27), the testimony of the State's own
witnesses that Tripp was very upset by Ihe accident and continued crying up to and
throughout the blood draw (R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 82), that her red eyes were
caused by her crying (R. 533: 70, 77), and that Tripp was smoking that night in an effort
to calm herself (R. 533:77).
Of central importance here, the court of appeals did address the facts encompassed
in finding 6, but reasonably held, on the basis of the trial court's finding that the police
detected no obvious signs of impairment, that there was no probable cause for the blood
draw. In discussing the interchange between Roberts and Tripp regarding the blood

38

draw, paragraph 6 of Tripp states the relevant facts:
During this exchange, Detective Roberts observed that Tripp appeared
nervous, was shaking, and had red eyes without any tears. Detective Roberts
testified that he began to believe that Tripp was impaired, based on her
apparent lack of concern for the victim, her continual smoking, and the fact
that the redness in her eyes was not dissipating. He also acknowledged that
it was normal for an individual involved in a serious accident to be shaky
and nervous.
Paragraph 22 of Tripp explains the court's application of the law to the decisive facts,
stating,
On the record before us, we cannot say that the totality of the
circumstances established probable cause to search Tripp's body for
incriminating evidence, i.e., to effect the blood draw. Officer Saunders
testified that he did not have a reasonable suspicion or belief that Tripp was
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Detective Roberts
testified that he was only asked by Officer Saunders to help obtain consent
and that he was not given any information that rose to the level of probable
cause. Detective Roberts further testified that while he observed that Tripp
had red eyes, possibly from crying, and that she was nervous and shaking,
he did not observe slurred speech, smell the odor of alcohol, or conduct any
field sobriety tests. Officer Monson testified that he did not smell alcohol or
observe any signs of impairment. Significantly, in its findings of fact, the
trial court found that "[n]o officer detected the odor of alcohol on the
defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as
poor balance or slurred speech."
The court of appeals' analysis squared with the relevant law and facts in the record.
The State argues that the court of appeals failed to account for the inference that
Tripp was driving under the influence, which purportedly arose from her pulling into the
intersection despite having an unobstructed view of Pracht. State's brief at 26. The
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physical evidence which remained after the accident counters the State's argument,
because the road Pracht was driving on is hilly and dips three eights of a mile prior to the
intersection (R. 533: 59-60). The road configuration or Tripp's own doorpost could have
blocked her view of Pracht's motorcycle as she entered the intersection (R. 533: 60).
At the time of the collision, Pracht may have been speeding, and this may have
been the cause of the accident. As the trial court recognized, the State's evidence
conflicted regarding whether he should have been driving fifty or sixty miles an hour (T.
526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the right to assume that Pracht
was going the speed limit (R. 533: 60-61). The State's accident reconstructionist
conceded that, due to a lack of underlying data from the police investigation, he would
not purchase stock if his decision were based on information of the same quality as he had
to work with in Tripp's case (R. 526: 516). Nonetheless, he estimated that Pracht was
driving at least 59 miles an hour, and may have been going faster than that (R. 526: 505,
514). He testified that if Pracht had been going fifty miles an hour, Tripp would have
cleared the intersection before Pracht came through, and that there would have been no
accident (R. 526:516).
Pracht's braking error may have caused the accident. The point of impact between
his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within three feet of either
side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the time of the crash
(R. 526: 509). The physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, Pracht was
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applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some forty-four feet
prior to sliding underneath and hitting Tripp's truck (R. 525: 355-56, 358, R. 526: 465).
Applying only the rear brake on a motorcycle routinely causes them to lose control and
slide (R. 526: 410, 415). Had Pracht been braking properly, he could have stopped or
steered around Tripp's truck, rather than sliding underneath and colliding with it as he did
(R. 532: 37-39). The officers at the scene did not have the benefit of an accident
reconstructionist, but were left to interpret the physical evidence, which did not indicate
that Tripp was the cause of the accident, let alone that she was under the influence when
it occurred. Detective Roberts conceded that Pracht may have been going ninety miles an
hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35).
On the facts of this case, as accurately stated by the court of appeals, the evidence
did not establish probable cause of any offense by Tripp. Compare State v. Worwood,
2007 UT 47,ffl[26-36, 164 P.3d 397 (Court found reasonable suspicion but no probable
cause that Worwood was driving under the influence, given his odor of alcohol, slurred
speech, and bloodshot eyes, and proximity to crushed beer can, cooler, and large water
spot on the road, because his walking and balance were steady), with State v. Rodriguez,
2007 UT 15,fflf3, 57, 59, 156 P.3d 711 (police had probable cause to justify a warrantless
blood draw, where driver made an abrupt left turn in front of an oncoming school bus,
accident was likely to be fatal, defendant had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and
vodka bottle was found at the scene of the accident) and People v. Roybal 655 P.2d 410
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(Colo. 1982) (odor of alcohol emanating from defendant and collision did not give rise to
probable cause, absent evidence that defendant was responsible for collision).
The State argues that the court of appeals ignored the weightiest evidence in the
probable cause equation, discussed in the trial court's eighth finding:
8. The victim advocate, Cecilia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car.
See State's brief at 26-27.15 The State also relies on the testimony of the blood tech that
he detected an odor of alcohol on Tripp as they spoke, and alleges that the victim
advocate, Cecelia Budd, noticed that Tripp slurred her words. State's brief at 6, citing R
533: 84.16
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Finding 8 is clearly erroneous in indicating that the victim advocate detected an
odor of alcohol on Tripp when Tripp was in a family car, and there is no evidence to
marshal in support of it. The victim advocate testified that she thought the odor of
alcohol in the family car came from Tripp, but did not know Tripp smelled of alcohol
until Tripp was under arrest and in Detective Roberts' police car, and then did not know if
the smell came from Tripp's clothing or her mouth (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: 76, 78, 8687). Tripp made this argument in the court of appeals and the State did not contest it.
Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging
Tripp's challenge and indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw)
and passim (failing to identify any evidence which supports the finding).
16

The assertion regarding purported slurred speech is erroneous. Page 84 of the
transcript reflects this testimony:
Q
Was she able to speak lucidly?
A
Yeah, she was speaking.
Q
I mean, she wasn't slurring her words?
A
I'm not familiar how she speaks but that day I spoke to her, yeah.
(R. 533: 84). In this testimony, Budd is agreeing with counsel that Tripp was not slurring
her words. Assuming arguendo that this testimony is fairly read as an indication that
Tripp was slurring her speech, there is no evidence that Budd informed the police of any
such observation.
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The court of appeals' focus on factors other than odors and speech observed by
non-police actors, in the absence of any evidence that their observations were conveyed to
the police prior to the blood draw, is correct. This is because in order to support
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support Fourth Amendment intrusions by the
police, the facts at issue must be known to the police. See, e ^ , United States v. Stewart,
867 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1989)(considering facts known by the police in assessing
lawfulness of search). Cf., e ^ , State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, If 17, 194 P.3d 925
(reasonableness of detention turns on objective analysis of facts known to the police).
Because the police never detected an odor of alcohol or slurred speech, and because there
is no evidence that they were informed of an odor of alcohol or slurred speech prior to the
blood draw, these factors would not have been proper to include in the objective analysis
of the facts known to the police which might establish probable cause. See, e.g., Stewart
and Applegate, supra.
The court of appeals correctly found that there was no probable cause to justify the
blood draw, and hence, the warrantless search of Tripp was not justified on the theory of
exigent circumstances, which requires proof of probable cause. See Tripp, 2008 UT App
388, Tffl 18-22. The court of appeals also correctly recognized that the absence of
probable cause defeats the claim that the evidence was salvageable from exclusion under
the inevitable discovery doctrine, because in the absence of probable cause, the police
would not inevitably have obtained a warrant and thereby obtained the blood sample. See
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id at *f 25. Accordingly, on certiorari, this Court should affirm the court of appeals's
decision.

B.

The Court Should Reject the Claim of Exigent Circumstances.

The State asks this Court to address the exigent circumstances on certiorari, rather
than remand to the court of appeals. Slate's brief at 27-28. In arguing exigent
circumstances, the State relies on the testimony of Officer Roberts that it would take him
a couple of hours to obtain a warrant, because he would "have to review all the
information with the officers at the scene,... call another detective to come and help [him]
draft the warrant and go with [him] to review the warrant with the district attorney and
then have it signed by a district court judge." The State notes that the accident occurred
at 7:00 on a Friday night, and argues that the courts would be closed at that time.
This testimony does not square with the advances in technology and in our law,
which permitted telephonic warrants at the time of Tripp's blood draw, and which make
warrants available to the police from magistrates regardless of court hours, in very short
amounts of time. See State v. Rodriguez. 2007 UT 15,fflf37-48, 156 P.3d 771 (in
rejecting State's claim of per se exigent circumstances in dissipating alcohol cases, the
Court canvassed the legal developments whereby police may obtain warrants by a number
of very efficient means, which should take between fifteen minutes and an hour). Courts
are not obliged to accept claims of exigent circumstances which are created by the police.
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See, e.g.. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah App. 1993).
The absence of probable cause that Tripp was impaired by alcohol is dispositive of
the exigent circumstances claim in any event. Compare Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f 59
(finding that compelling evidence and probable cause that driver was impaired in
apparently fatal accident created exigent circumstance to justify warrantless blood draw).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' analysis of exigent
circumstances.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ANALYSIS
WAS CORRECT.

The State contends that the court of appeals misunderstood its burden under the
inevitable discovery doctrine set forth in State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159,
and ignored pertinent evidence. State's Brief at 29-32. By reviewing the Tripp decision,
the Court may readily confirm the correctness of the court of appeals' articulation of the
State's burden under Topanotes to provide persuasive evidence that the police would have
obtained the same evidence through means independent from police illegalities. See
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388,fflf23-24. Accord Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, If 16.
Because there was no probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant which
would have been essential to obtaining the evidence through the independent means of a
warrant, see Point III of this brief, supra, the court of appeals correctly declined to apply
the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, Tf 25.
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The State suggests that the court of appeals failed to consider the evidence that
Detective Roberts told the blood tech that he would call him back in a couple of hours
after he got a warrant, as proof that the blood inevitably would have been drawn. State's
Brief at 30. The court of appeals did consider this testimony in noting that the evidentiary
content of the blood would be dissipating during the time it would take him to apply for a
warrant he should not have been able to obtain for lack of probable cause in any event.
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, lj 24 n.10, and f25. His statement to the blood tech about how
long it would take to get a warrant, which was made while Tripp was being held in a
police car, may well have been part of his campaign to compel Tripp to submit to a test
under threat of a warrant. It is no substitute for proof that he actually would have sought
a warrant, particularly given the undisputed evidence that given that the police believed
they did not need a warrant and could forcibly take Tripp's blood, given the seriousness
of the accident (R. 525: 10, 25, R. 532: 23, R. 533: 33-34).
The court of appeals did not misunderstand or unfairly augment the State's burden
under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Rather, the court correctly found that the doctrine
does not apply on the facts of Tripp's case, because the absence of probable cause to draw
the blood would not inevitably have resulted in the issuance of a warrant. See id.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Tripp decision. Alternatively, the Court should
remand the matter to the court of appeals for its consideration of the issues left
unaddressed by the Tripp decision.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
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Susan TRIPP, Defendant and Appellant.
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Oct 30, 2008.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, John Paul Kennedy,
J. of automobile homicide. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
(1) defendant did not voluntarily consent to warrantless
blood draw;
(2) exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement could not justify warrantless blood draw; and
(3) inevitable discovery doctrine did not justify
warrantless blood draw.
Reversed and remanded.

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k78 k. Samples and Tests; Identification
Procedures. Most Cited Cases
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures, including in situations where blood is drawn
from a suspect and then analyzed. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k24 k. Necessity of and Preference for Warrant,
and Exceptions in General. Most Cited Cases
Searches conducted without warrants are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k23 k. Fourth Amendment and Reasonableness
in General. Most Cited Cases

349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl71 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Warrantless searches based on valid consent are not per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. U,S£A>
Const.Amend. 4.
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3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Warrantless searches based on probable cause where
exigent circumstances obviate the need for a warrant are
not per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[5] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^180

349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349k 179 Validity of Consent
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most
Cited Cases
Consent to a warrantless search which is not voluntarily
given is invalid. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most
Cited Cases
The appropriate standard to determine whether consent to
a warrantless search is voluntary is the totality of the
circumstances test. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349k 179 Validity of Consent
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most
Cited Cases
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349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl84 k. Custody, Restraint, or Detention
Issues. Most Cited Cases
Under the totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether consent to a warrantless search is voluntary, a
court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most
Cited Cases
Consent to a warrantless search is not voluntary if it is
obtained as the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
349VI Judicial Review or Determination
349k 195 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
349kl98 k. Validity of Consent. Most Cited
Cases
Court must look to see if there is clear and positive
testimony that consent to a warrantless search was
unequivocal and freely given. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most
Cited Cases
Consent to a warrantless search is not voluntary where a
person's will is overborne or his or her capacity for
self-determination is critically impaired. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

48A Automobiles
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak417 Grounds for Test
48Ak418 k. Consent, Express or Implied. Most
Cited Cases
Defendant did not voluntarily consent to warrantless
search consisting of blood draw, where defendant
continuously refused to submit to blood draw, expressed
fear of needles, was arrested and threatened that she would
be forced to provide the blood as soon as warrant was
obtained, and cried and pulled away during blood draw.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[11] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>194

[14] Automobiles 48A €^>418

349 Searches and Seizures
349VI Judicial Review or Determination
349kl92 Presumptions and Burden of Proof
349k 194 k. Consent, and Validity Thereof. Most
Cited Cases
The State has the burden of establishing that consent to a
warrantless search was validly given. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

48A Automobiles
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak417 Grounds for Test
48Ak418 k. Consent, Express or Implied. Most
Cited Cases
Defendant's failure to immediately withdraw her arm after
blood technician said "we can go ahead and [take] care of
this" did not constitute consent to warrantless blood draw,
where defendant, who was terrified, crying, and panicked
throughout, was surrounded in a police car by an officer
outside the door covering her eyes, a victims' advocate
kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the
blood technician outside the car holding her arm where
she could not see it. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[12] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 2 0 1

349 Searches and Seizures
3 49VI Judicial Review or Determination
349k201 k. Questions of Law or Fact. Most Cited
Cases
Voluntariness of consent to a warrantless search is
primarily a factual question, and the analysis used to
determine voluntariness is the same without regard to
whether the consent was obtained after illegal police
conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[13] Automobiles 48A €^>418

[15] Criminal Law 110 € ^ H 3 4 . 6 0

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)5 Theory and Grounds of Decision
in Lower Court
1 lOkl 134.60 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
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Court of Appeals may affirm the judgment appealed from
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent
on the record.

Page 4

349k44 k. Presence of Probable Cause. Most
Cited Cases
To justify a warrantless search based on exigent
circumstances, there must be probable cause. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

[16] Automobiles 48A €^>419
[19] Searches and Seizures 349 €=>42.1
48A Automobiles
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak417 Grounds for Test
48Ak419 k. Grounds or Cause; Necessity for
Arrest. Most Cited Cases
There was no probable cause to believe that defendant had
committed an alcohol-related driving offense at the time
her blood was drawn without her consent, and thus exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement could
not justify warrantless blood draw, where defendant had
no odor of alcohol nor any obvious signs of impairment,
such as poor balance or slurred speech. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

[17] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^42.1

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A generally recognized exception to the warrant
requirement is the one referred to as exigent
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[18] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>44

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 4 4

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant
349k44 k. Presence of Probable Cause. Most
Cited Cases
A warrantless search is constitutionally permissible where
probable cause and exigent circumstances are proven.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[20] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 4 4

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant
349k44 k. Presence of Probable Cause. Most
Cited Cases
The exigencies of a situation may excuse the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained, but
not the requirement that a search be premised on probable
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cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[24] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 5 5

[21] Searches and Seizures 349 €==>40.1

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k40 Probable Cause
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Probable cause for a search exists when an officer believes
that a suspect has committed or is committing an offense.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k53 Scope, Conduct, and Duration of
Warrantless Search
349k55 k. Skin, Strip, and Body Searches. Most
Cited Cases
Where what is sought to be searched is a person's body,
sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search exists
only when there is a clear indication that evidence will be
found as a result of the search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[22] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>40.1

[25] Criminal Law 110 €^394.1(3)

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k40 Probable Cause
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The facts surrounding a probable cause determination for
a search are examined in light of the totality of the
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency m General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.1 In General
110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct
on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases
The crux of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that since
tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered
through an independent source, it should be admissible if
it inevitably would have been discovered. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

[23] Searches and Seizures 349 €=>42.1

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances;
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search may
exist when there is an urgency to acquire evidence that
falls outside the ordinary course of law enforcement, such
as situations where obtaining a warrant would place
officers or the public at an unacceptable risk or where the
destruction of essential evidence is imminent. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

[26] Criminal Law 110 €=^394.1(3)

110 Criminal Law
11OXVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency in General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.1 In General
110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct
on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases
For tainted evidence to be admissible under the inevitable
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discovery doctrine, there must be some independent basis
for discovery, and the investigation that inevitably would
have led to the evidence must be independent of the
constitutional violation tainting the evidence. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
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Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.

Before Judges GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME.

[27] Criminal Law 110 €^394.4(13)

110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency in General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.4 Unlawful Search or Seizure
110k394.4(13) k. Persons. Most Cited
Cases
Inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to allow
admission of results of warrantless blood draw from
defendant without her consent in prosecution for
automobile homicide, where detective would not have
necessarily been able to obtain warrant for forcible blood
draw based on available evidence. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

OPINION

ORME, Judge:

U 1 Alleging error in the denial of her pretrial motion to
suppress evidence, Susan Tripp appeals from her jury
conviction of automobile homicide. We conclude that the
appeal is well-taken, reverse the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress evidence, and remand for a new trial.

* 102 BACKGROUND

Tf 2"The legal analysis of search and seizure cases is highly
fact dependent." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, | 2, 103
P.3d 699. We therefore recite the facts in some detail.

[28] Criminal Law 110 €^394.1(3)

110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency in General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.1 In General
110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct
on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases
For tainted evidence to be admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, there must be persuasive evidence of
events or circumstances apart from those resulting in
illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to
discovery. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
*101 Ronald J. Yengich, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

\ 3 On April 23, 2004, Tripp was driving eastbound on
the Old Bingham Highway in Salt Lake County, Utah. She
stopped at the stop sign at the U - l l l intersection and,
after stopping, pulled out and collided with a motorcyclist
traveling southbound on U-l 11 . ^ T h e motorcyclist died
soon after from injuries sustained in the crash.

FN1. Trial testimony by experts put the
motorcyclist's speed just prior to impact at about
sixty miles per hour, the posted speed limit.

\ 4 Police and emergency personnel immediately arrived
on the scene, including West Jordan Police Officer
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Saunders, who asked Tripp if he could obtain a blood
sample from her. Although Officer Saunders testified at
trial that he did not observe any signs indicating that
Tripp was impaired and that he did not have any
reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of
any substance, he testified that he seeks blood draws in
serious accidents as a matter of course. And the trial court,
in its findings, indicated that "[n]o officer detected the
odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe any
obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or
slurred speech." Tripp denied consuming alcohol or
prescription drugs when asked by Officer Saunders.

If 5 Tripp told Officer Saunders that she did not want to
submit to a blood test because she did not like needles but
that she was willing to consent to a urinalysis. Officer
Saunders then conferred with an automobile homicide
investigator, Detective Roberts, informing him that Tripp
was unwilling to submit to a blood draw because she was
scared of needles. After some discussion, the two officers
determined that a blood sample was necessary and decided
to renew the effort to obtain Tripp's consent for a blood
draw. ™2

FN2. The record is devoid of any indication that
a Breathalyzer or Intoxilyzer test was
considered-a rather curious fact given that Tripp
was not generally uncooperative and stood ready
to provide a urine sample or even a blood
sample, provided a needle was not used. One
might surmise that a suspect ready to provide a
roadside urine sample would readily provide a
breath sample instead, if given that choice. Nor
did Officer Saunders or Detective Roberts at any
time request that Tripp undergo any alternative
tests, such as field sobriety tests.

f 6 Detective Roberts then approached Tripp and again
asked for her consent to a blood draw, which she refused
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to provide-again citing her fear of needles. She renewed
the offer to furnish a urine sample and, indeed, a blood
sample-provided a needle was not used to obtain it.
Detective Roberts told Tripp that he did not know of any
other way to obtain blood and suggested that her fear of
needles was something that could be worked around.
Detective Roberts explained that the department's blood
technician was highly skilled and would be able to do the
draw quickly and relatively painlessly. During this
exchange, Detective Roberts observed that Tripp
appeared nervous, was shaking, and had red eyes without
any tears. Detective Roberts testified that he began to
believe that Tripp was impaired, based on her apparent
lack of concern for the victim, her continual smoking, and
the fact that the redness in her eyes was not dissipating. He
also acknowledged that it was normal for an individual
involved in a serious accident to be shaky and nervous.

K 7 Because Detective Roberts's further attempts to obtain
Tripp's consent were unsuccessful, he approached the
department's victims' rights advocates, whose presence is
often requested at the scene of serious accidents, for
assistance, to see "if they could calm [ Tripp] down and
... have her become more relaxed to the idea of having a
blood draw." In the presence of Tripp's family-who had
arrived at the scene a few minutes after the accident-and
the advocates, Detective Roberts again asked Tripp to
submit to a blood draw, and Tripp "adamantly refused to
submit." Based on this refusal and protestations from
Tripp's family at his repeated requests for a blood draw,
Detective Roberts took Tripp into custody,™3 removing
her from *103 her vehicle and placing her in the back of
a police vehicle. Detective Roberts told Tripp that she
was now in custody and that he was going to obtain a
warrant and force the blood draw. Detective Roberts,
however, never tried to secure the warrant because the
blood technician, Brian Davis, arrived on the scene
immediately after this exchange.

FN3. Throughout the briefs, both parties seem to
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use the concepts of "arrest" and "custody"
interchangeably. Indeed, at the suppression
hearing, Detective Roberts testified both that he
took Tripp into "custody" and that he put her
under arrest. Because the parties consistently
characterize Tripp's custody as amounting to an
arrest, we have no occasion to consider whether
her detention was only a "level two"
investigative detention. See generally State v.
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 21, 164 P.3d 397.

covering her eyes, a victims' rights advocate kneeling in
front of her holding one of her hands, and Davis outside
the car door holding her arm in such a way that she could
not see it. Cecilia Budd, the victims' rights advocate who
was with her, consistently reassured Tripp and told her
that she had seen Davis draw blood before and that he was
very good. After the draw, Tripp became calm and was
surprised that the blood draw was done.

U 8 Detective Roberts explained the situation to Davis-that
Tripp would not consent, that it was going to take several
hours to obtain a warrant, and that he would call Davis
back once the warrant had been obtained. Upon learning
that Tripp refused consent only because of her fear of
needles, Davis replied, "[W]ell, if that's all it is, let me talk
to her. I'm usually pretty good at getting them to work
around their fear of needles." Davis then went to talk with
Tripp in the back of Officer Monson's patrol car.

\ 9 Davis tried to reassure Tripp of the relative ease and
painlessness of the blood draw procedure. Tripp insisted
that she was afraid and that even her own doctor would not
draw her blood because of her fear. Davis testified that he
thought he would be able to obtain her consent based on
his reassurances, told this to Detective Roberts, and said,
"I really think we can probably go ahead and do this.
We've got her reassured and talked into this[.]" Davis then
put a tourniquet on Tripp's arm to see "if we can find a
spot that would be easy to do this," to which Tripp
responded, "Okay, we'll go ahead and do that." Tripp
stuck her arm out for Davis to apply the tourniquet. Davis
told her that he found an easy site and that "we can go
ahead and [take] care of this." Davis testified that Tripp
probably did not know that he had his equipment ready
and that he was prepared to draw her blood and that he
"just kind of stuck her with the needle as quick as [he]
could and got the blood done." During the draw, Tripp
was in a police car with an officer outside the door

f 10 Officer Monson, who witnessed the blood draw,
testified that"[ Tripp] looked terrified. She had talked to
us about her fear of needles and she looked terrified." He
also testified that she was "pulling away. She was crying,"
but that she had "offered her arm." Budd testified that, at
times, Tripp was uncontrollably crying. The blood draw
showed a metabolite of cocaine and a blood alcohol level
just above the legal limit.

K 11 The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section
76-5-207(2), seeUtah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)
(Supp.2007), and with failure to yield the right of way, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section
41-6-72.10(3), jeeUtah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(3) (1998)
(current version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-902 (2005)).
Tripp moved to suppress the blood test results. After an
evidentiary hearing, the motion to suppress was denied.
The trial court found that Tripp voluntarily consented to
the blood draw, that her initial refusal was based "solely
on her fear of needles, and [that] the evidence
demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the
defendant's fear was resolved." Having been convicted
following a jury trial, Tripp now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

f 12 Tripp argues that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to suppress. Specifically, Tripp challenges the
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trial court's finding that she consented to the blood
draw.™4 *104 "We review the factual findings underlying
the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard.
However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law
based on these findings for correctness [.]" State v. Veteto,
2000 UT 62, 11 8, 6 P.3d 1133 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Further, we grant no deference
to the trial court in its application of the law to its factual
findings. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, H 15, 103 P.3d
699.™

FN4. It was suggested from the bench during oral
argument before this court that perhaps Tripp
had consented to providing a blood sample, just
not to the method employed in extracting it, and
that given that her articulated concern was on
that basis rather than protections enshrined in the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments, the blood draw
might constitute a battery but should not trigger
evidentiary suppression. That angle was not
pursued by the State, perhaps because of the
reality that blood can only be extracted by means
of a needle, and we are aware of no authority
supporting the notion that it is conceptually
possible to consent to a blood draw while
withholding consent to being pricked with a
needle.

FN5. Tripp also argues that the trial court erred
in not allowing the jurors to consider whether the
motorcyclist's conduct was a superseding cause
of the accident. Given our disposition, we need
not address this issue.

ANALYSIS

[1][2][3][4] U 13 The Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures, including in situations
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where blood is drawn from a suspect and then analyzed.
See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives'Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,616,109 S.Ct. 1402. 103
L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)), cert denied,9%2 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999). "[S]earches conducted... without [warrants]... are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88
S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
Such exceptions include searches based on valid consent,
see State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990), and
searches based on probable cause where exigent
circumstances obviate the need for a warrant, see State v.
Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f 16, 156 P.3d 771.

I. Consent

[5][6][7][8][9][10][11] 1 14 We start with consideration
of whether Tripp consented voluntarily to the blood draw.
"[Cjonsent which is not voluntarily given is invalid."
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218,228,93 S.Ct. 2041,36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973);
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 292-93. The appropriate standard
to determine whether consent is voluntary "is the totality
of the circumstances test." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,
1j56,63 P.3d 650. "Under the totality of the circumstances
test, a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of
the detention, and the characteristics of the defendant." Id.
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041).
"Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product
of duress or coercion, express or implied.' " State v.
Eisner, 2001 UT 99,1f47,37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted).
" '[W]e further look to see if there is clear and positive
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely
given.'" Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at293 (citation omitted). "In
other words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may
his "capacity for self-determination [be] critically
impaired.' " Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 57, 63 P.3d 650
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The State, of
course, has the burden of establishing that consent was
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validly given. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.

[12] f 15"Voluntariness is primarily a factual question,
and the analysis used to determine voluntariness is the
same without regard to whether the consent was obtained
after illegal police conduct." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). Thus, if we
determine that Tripp did not voluntarily consent to having
her blood drawn, we need not reach the issue of "whether
the consent was obtained by police exploitation of [a]
prior illegality." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. See also
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. The State argues that Tripp
voluntarily consented to a warrantless blood draw in light
of the totality of the circumstances. We disagree.

[13] K 16 Given the totality of the circumstances, we
cannot say that there is "clear and positive testimony" that
Tripp "unequivocally] and freely" consented to having
her blood drawn. See Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation
omitted). After refusing to submit * 105 to a blood draw
several times-to Officer Saunders, to Detective Roberts,
and to Brian Davis-Tripp was informed that she was in
custody, removed from the presence of her family, and
placed in a police car. Detective Roberts testified that she
was arrested because "the more [the officers] tried to
convince her, the more defiant she became ... and we were
losing control of the situation." She was told that if she did
not submit, a warrant would be obtained and she would be
forced to give a blood sample. A warrant was never
sought, however, because the blood technician, Brian
Davis, told Detective Roberts, "I really think we can
probably go ahead and do this." When Tripp extended her
arm prior to the blood test, to the extent the gesture was
voluntary at all under the circumstances, it was in response
to Davis's telling her that he was going to apply the
tourniquet and see if he could find an easy spot to draw
blood. Davis even testified that he was not sure that Tripp
knew that he had his blood drawing equipment ready and
was prepared to draw her blood when she extended her
arm. Once he found an easy site to draw from, he told her
"we can go ahead and [take] care of this," and he
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proceeded to immediately draw her blood without an
express indication of her consent and without first
allowing her to reaffirm, yet again, her refusal to consent.
[14] If 17 The State contends that Trippfs failure to
immediately withdraw her arm must be taken as a clear
indication of her consent. We cannot agree. During the
blood draw, Tripp was surrounded by people working for
the State-she was in a police car with an officer outside the
door covering her eyes, a victims' advocate kneeling in
front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood
technician outside the car holding her arm where she could
not see it. All the while Tripp was, according to the
witnesses, terrified, crying, and panicked. Given the
context of the threat of a forced blood draw, her arrest by
the police, and the presence and participation of the State's
many actors during the blood draw, we cannot say that
Tripp voluntarily consented to have her blood drawn
simply because she failed to retract her arm in the instant
between when Davis said "we can go ahead and [take]
care of this"-an ambiguous comment as concerns the
timing of the intended blood draw in any event-and when
he inserted the needle. Indeed, Officer Monson, the officer
who witnessed the draw, testified that although Tripp
initially offered her arm to Davis, "[s]he was pulling
away," and "[s]he was crying. I tried to shield her eyes so
[she] wouldn't look at the needle." The State argues that
this is a natural response from someone who fears needles.
We think, however, that given the context of her
continuous refusals to submit to a blood draw, her
expressed fear of needles, her arrest, the threat that she
would be forced to provide the blood as soon as a warrant
was obtained,™6 and her crying and pulling away during
the blood draw, the State has failed to meet its burden and
to demonstrate that Tripp voluntarily gave consent under
the totality of the circumstances.™7 See generally Arroyo,
796 P.2d at 687.

FN6. Although in many cases such a "threat"
would be neither inaccurate nor coercive, see,
e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1207
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(Utah 1995); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268,
1273-74 (Utah Ct.App.1990), this is not such a
case. Here, as discussed in Part II, there was no
demonstrated probable cause to justify an
involuntary blood draw.

FN7. This case stands in stark contrast to State v.
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct.App.1998),
cert denied,982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), where we
readily agreed with the State that a defendant
who offered his arm to a blood technician had
consented to the blood draw. See id. at 293. In
that case, the defendant offered no resistance, the
defendant did not say "no" or object in any way,
and the defendant's blood was taken in a much
less coercive environment, i.e., the defendant
was in the back of an ambulance with only one
officer present.

II. Exigent Circumstances

[15][16] If 18 The State next asks us to affirm Tripp's
conviction because Detective Roberts was justified in
"forcing a blood draw under the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement."While this court
"may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record,"State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, f 11, 173
P.3d *106 213 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted), we do not agree that the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement justified the
warrantless blood draw in this case.™8

FN8. Neither, apparently, did the trial court,
which premised its decision entirely on consent.
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circumstances." See State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15,^16,
156 P.3d 771. But to justify a warrantless search based on
exigent circumstances, there must still be probable cause.
See State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT App 65, f 9, 108
P.3d 123 ("[A] warrantless search ... is constitutionally
permissible where probable cause and exigent
circumstances are proven.") (first alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v.
Comer, 2002 UT App 219,ffi[21, 24, 51 P.3d 55 (same),
cert denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). In other words, the
exigencies of a situation may excuse the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained, but
not the requirement that a search be premised on probable
cause.

[21][22] Tf 20 Probable cause exists when "an officer ...
believe[s] that the suspect has committed or is committing
an offense." Despain, 2007 UT App 367, K 9, 173 P.3d
213 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
facts surrounding a probable cause determination are
examined in light of the totality of the circumstances. See
id

[23 ] [24] ^ 21 Exigent circumstances may exist when there
is "an urgency to acquire evidence that falls outside the
ordinary course of law enforcement,"7todngwez, 2007 UT
15, If 16,156 P.3d 771, such as situations where obtaining
a warrant would place officers or the public at an
unacceptable risk or where the destruction of essential
evidence is imminent, see id. And where what is sought to
be searched is a person's body, "sufficient probable cause
exists only [when there is] 'a clear indication that evidence
will be found as a result of the search.' " State v. Alverez,
2006 UT 61,1 22, 147 P.3d 425 (quoting Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d
908(1966)).

f 22 On the record before us, we cannot say that the
[ 17] [ 18] [ 19] [20] K19 A generally recognized exception to totality of the circumstances established probable cause to
search Trippfs body for incriminating evidence, i.e., to
the warrant requirement is the one referred to as "exigent
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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effect the blood draw. Officer Saunders testified that he
did not have a reasonable suspicion or belief that Tripp
was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Detective Roberts testified that he was only asked by
Officer Saunders to help obtain consent and that he was
not given any information that rose to the level of probable
cause. Detective Roberts further testified that while he
observed that Tripp had red eyes, possibly from crying,
and that she was nervous and shaking, he did not observe
slurred speech, smell the odor of alcohol, or conduct any
field sobriety tests. Officer Monson testified that he did
not smell alcohol or observe any signs of impairment.
Significantly, in its findings of fact, the trial court found
that "[n]o officer detected the odor of alcohol on the
defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of
impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech."
Thus, the State has not met its burden of demonstrating
that there was probable cause to believe that Tripp had
committed an alcohol-related offense at the time her blood
was drawn without her consent, FN9 and we thus have no
occasion to determine whether sufficient exigent
circumstances existed to excuse obtaining a warrant. See
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 21, 147 P.3d 425.

FN9. Whether or not sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for a blood draw could
have been garnered is an entirely different
matter. Given the investigating officers'
single-minded focus on getting Tripp to consent
to have her blood drawn, amassing facts to
establish probable cause was simply not their
objective. Had it been, they could have employed
field sobriety tests and perhaps a Breathalyzer or
Intoxilyzer test to develop probable cause for
taking a sample of Tripp's blood.

III. Inevitable Discovery

[25][26][27] f 23 Additionally, the State contends that
Tripp's blood alcohol content would inevitably have been
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discovered and that we should therefore affirm the denial
of the motion to suppress. The crux of the *107 inevitable
discovery doctrine is that since " 'tainted evidence would
be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent
source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have
been discovered.' " State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 14,
76 P.3d 1159 (citation omitted). However, "there must be
some 'independent basis for discovery,' and 'the
investigation that inevitably would have led to the
evidence [must] be independent of the constitutional
violation.' " Id % 16 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).

[28] U 24 The State's argument that it would inevitably
have discovered the blood alcohol evidence is conjectural
at best. The record does not indicate that a warrant would
actually have been issued in this case or that the desired
blood test results would actually have been obtained
thereby.™10 "For courts confidently to predict what would
have occurred, ... there must be persuasive evidence of
events or circumstances apart from those resulting in
illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to
discovery." Id.

FN 10. Detective Roberts told Brian Davis it
would be several hours before a warrant could be
obtained, during which time the alcohol in
Tripp's system would be dissipating.

If 25 There is no such persuasive evidence here. Indeed,
the only evidence relevant to securing a warrant was that
Officer Saunders did not believe a warrant was required in
serious accidents, that Detective Roberts threatened to
obtain a warrant and force a blood draw, and that
Detective Roberts thought obtaining a warrant would take
a few hours. In any event, we have already held that the
record before us does not establish a basis for concluding
that there was probable cause to justify a forcible blood
draw. We therefore cannot say that Detective Roberts
would have necessarily been able to obtain a warrant
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based on the available evidence, and thus we decline to
affirm on the basis of the inevitable discovery doclrine.

CONCLUSION

U 26 We reverse the trial court's denial of Tripp's motion
to suppress the blood test results because the State did not
meet its burden of proving that her consent was voluntary.
We also decline to affirm on the exigent circumstances
rationale offered by the State because the State did not
demonstrate that there was probable cause for a forcible
blood draw. Nor does the inevitable discovery doctrine
provide a proper basis on which to affirm. Accordingly,
we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress and
remand for a new trial or such other proceedings as may
now be appropriate.

1 27 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Presiding Judge, and JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge.

Utah App.,2008.
State v. Tripp
197 P.3d 99, 616 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2008 UT App 388
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

0£lH
-vs-

o33oo

Case No. 944404-951

SUSAN TRIPP,

Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, having come before this Court for
hearing m the above entitled manner on February 25, 2005, and Oral Argument on April
18, 2005, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Barton J. Warren, and the
State was represented by co-counsel, Kim Cordova and Sandi Johnson. The Court having
reviewed the parties' written briefs and considered oral arguments of counsel, the Court
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in
the death of Daniel Pracht.
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that officers
could test her blood if they did not use a needle

3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on her fear
of needles.
4. When speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using alcohol or
drugs and expressed her fear of needles.
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired
by something.
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to
lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily.
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe
any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech.
8. The victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car.
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked vehicle
and secluded from her family and friends because they were interfering with
the investigation.
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective Roberts
unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the vehicle, with the
door open and her legs outside the vehicle.
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or shackled.

2

12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecelia Budd were present, and
neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also nearby, but he was
not in uniform.
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood draw
and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant.
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her right to
counsel, and her right to refuse the test.
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the
defendant voluntarily extended her arm.
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to withdraw her
arm and she never said "no" or "stop."
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm and
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be.

3

CONCLUSIONS OFT A W
1- The defendant'

s initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, and

^ e evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the defendant':
fear was resolved.
2- The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw.
3- The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible.
DATED this ^ i day of ^ 2 0 0 5 .
BY THE COURT:

4

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

United States v. Arrington. 2008 WL 4459378
(unpublished decision)

Westlaw,
Slip Copy
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4459378 (S.D.Fla.)
(Cite as: 2008 WL 4459378 (S.D.Fla.))
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this 1st day of October 2008.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,
S.D. Florida.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Gregory ARRINGTON, Defendant.
No. 08-20395-CR.

Oct. 2, 2008.

Sharad Anand Motiani, United States Attorney's Office,
Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
ADOPTING MAGISTRA TErS REPORT AND
RECOMMENDA TION

FEDERICO A. MORENO, District Judge.

*1 THIS MATTER was referred to the Honorable Edwin
Torres, United States Magistrate Judge. A Report and
Recommendation [D.E. # 35] has been filed and the
Government has filed an Objection to the Report and
Recommendation [D.E. # 38] and the Defendant has
responded [D.E. # 39].

After a de novo review the Court is overruling the
Government's objection and suppressing the evidence for
the reasons stated in the Magistrate's Report.

DONE and ORDERED in Miami-Dade County Florida

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
STA TEMENTS AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

EDWIN G. TORRES, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Statements and Physical Evidence [D.E. 24] that
seeks to suppress all statements and physical evidence
obtained from Defendant following an alleged unlawful
entry into a motel room he was occupying on April 10,
2007. The Government responded in opposition to the
motion [D.E. 25]. Following the referral of the motion to
the undersigned Magistrate Judge [D.E. 26], an
evidentiary hearing was conducted on August 29, 2008.
The parties then submitted supplemental briefing in
support of their positions based on the testimony elicited
at the hearing. [D.E. 31,34]. The Court has reviewed the
entire record in the case, from which the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law are based. Upon
review of that record, there is no choice but to recommend
that the Defendant's Motion be Granted.

/. FINDINGS OF FACT

Homestead police officers Ricky Rivera and Lewis Hosch
testified at the hearing on behalf of the Government. They
testified that on April 10, 2007, Officer Anthony Green
from the Homestead Police Department received a tip
from an individual seeking credit for cooperation with law
enforcement. That individual identified Gregory Arrington
by name as someone who was selling narcotics out of
Room 135 of the Caribe Motel located at 841 N. Krome
Avenue. The source also told the police that the individual
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was armed with a gun.

The Caribe Motel is known to the Homestead Police as a
location that has been used for prostitution and narcotics
activities. Gregory Arrington, however, was not known to
the officers, nor was his background investigated by
officers at that time. Instead, members of the Homestead
Police Special Investigations Unit then proceeded to the
Caribe Motel to conduct a "knock and talk" investigation
of Room 135. Their plan was first to try and see what the
occupant would do if an officer approached asking to buy
drugs. If that did not work, the officers intended to get the
occupant to open the door. Several plain clothes officers
from the Unit were part of the team, together with two
uniformed Homestead police officers.

At approximately 12:18 P.M., the officers went to the
Caribe Motel. Room 135 is at the far end of the ground
floor to the two-story building. The room has no window
adjacent to the door from where an occupant could see out
to the front area, though the door itself has a small peep
hole. Detective Rivera, in plain clothes, knocked on the
door, while the accompanying officers stood by to his
right side away from the door. Detective Rivera, as
planned, initially attempted to impersonate a narcotics
purchaser, using a name like "Julio" who wanted to buy
some drugs. The occupant inside the motel room, who we
know now was Defendant Gregory Arrington, responded
by asking "Who?" The officer repeated what he had said
a few times, but the occupant kept asking "Who?" and
then said "Go away." Detective Rivera then knocked on
the door again. This time, however, he identified himself
as a Homestead police officer and directed thai the
Defendant open the door: "Homestead Police. Open the
Door."

*2 At the hearing, Detective Rivera initially attempted to
downplay how forceful he may have been in coaxing
Defendant to open the door. On cross-examineition,
however, Detective Rivera was quite clear that he directed
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the occupant to open the door and "come out for a minute
....I want to talk to you."Detective Hosch, who was the
team leader and organized the operation, never wavered
that the officers told the occupant to "open the door"
several times. At the moment that Detective Rivera
demanded that the occupant open the door, he was armed,
was displaying his badge around his neck, was wearing a
police vest, and was accompanied by at least four other
armed Homestead Police Detectives and uniformed
officers.

After several knocks and repeated commands from
Detective Rivera to "open the door," the Defendant then
partially opened the door with his left hand. As he did so,
Detective Rivera quickly observed that the Defendant was
holding a revolver in his right hand against his side.
Detective Rivera immediately began alternating between
identifying himself as a police officer and ordering the
defendant to drop the gun. The Detective dropped to one
knee in a bracing position, pointed his gun at the
Defendant, and blocked the door from closing with his
foot. The Defendant then began walking backwards in the
motel room, while facing Detective Rivera with the gun
still held in his right hand. The Defendant then complied
with Detective Rivera's orders and dropped the firearm
behind him onto the bed.

The officers then moved in to the motel room and secured
the defendant, the firearm, and a woman by the name of
Lisa Carter who was also inside. The officers immediately
conducted a sweep of the room. They could see crack
cocaine and curency on top of a microwave near the front
door crack. They could also see in plain view two bags of
marijuana on the table. They also seized the revolver from
the bed that was loaded with six rounds of ammunition.

The Defendant was then taken to the police station for
processing and an interview. At approximately 1:55 P.M.,
the Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights by
Detective Harris and Detective Rivera. The Defendant
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acknowledged that he understood his rights by writing his
initials next to each right. He then indicated that he wished
to waive his rights and make a statement. He signed the
Miranda form. The Defendant admitted that he possessed
the gun to protect himself from an individual who had
previously threatened him.

The pending motion seeks to suppress the physical
evidence obtained from the motel room, as well as the
Defendant's subsequent statements, as fruit of the
poisonous tree stemming from an illegal entry into the
motel room. Defendant's motion argued that there was no
probable cause or exigent circumstances to enter the motel
room. Following the facts elicited at the hearing, however,
Defendant's argument focused on whether Defendant
voluntarily consented to open the motel room door, as the
Government argues, or whether he merely submitted to
lawful authority by complying with their order to open the
door. Defendant does not dispute that, if the door was
voluntarily opened, Defendant's pointing of a gun in their
direction entitled the officers to secure the Defendant and
conduct a protective sweep of the room. Defendant instead
argues that the door was not opened by consent and that
the officers in effect forced their way into the motel room
without a warrant.

*3 The Government does not argue that there was
probable cause to enter the motel room upon the officers'
arrival to the area. Instead, the Government limits its
argument to the consent issue-that Defendant voluntarily
opened the door in response to a request from Detective
Rivera, which was clearly an exception to the warrant
requirement. Having provided that consent, the officers
had the right to protect themselves when presented with an
armed individual at the door. Note as well that the
Government does not dispute that, if the entry into the
motel room was in fact unlawful, the subsequent seizure of
the physical evidence and the Defendant's statements
related to that evidence should be suppressed under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
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III. ANALYSIS

"It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable."Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639
(1980)."Except in special situations, we have consistently
held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or
make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant."Steagald
v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68
L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). That is because "the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the
house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may
not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.'Vd. at 212
(citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).

The Government concedes that, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, this presumption applies with equal force to a
hotel or motel room because the same expectation of
privacy exists for such a dwelling. See, e.g., United States
v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir.1994); United
States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir.1984).

Hence, the burden on the government to justify a
warrantless entry into this temporary dwelling-Defendant's
motel room at the Caribe Motel-is a heavy one:

The general requirement that a search warrant be obtained
is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on
those seeking an exemption from the requirement to
show the need for it....

United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662,669 (11th Cir.2000)
(internal quotation marks, quotations omitted); see also
United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("Because the protections of the fourth
amendment are crucial to a free and viable society, the
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government shoulders a heavy burden of justifying the
failure to obtain a warrant prior to the intrusion."); Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150
L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and
hence constitutional must be answered no.").

Consent to a warrantless entry or search is one of the
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement that can
satisfy the Government's burden. Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429,439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)
("The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary
cooperation."); United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237,
1241 (11th Cir.1999). In order for there to be valid
consent in lieu of a warrant, and to overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness, the Government must
prove "that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not
satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of
lawful authority."Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497,
103 S.Ct. 1319,75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The Government
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, thmt the
consent was unequivocal, specifically and intentionally
given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
E.g., id. at 497-9$\UnitedStates v. Worley, 193 F.3d380,
386 (6th Cir. 1999)."Consent that is the product of official
intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens
do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are
coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to
refuse."Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.

*4 Whether or not there was free and voluntary consent is
a factual question that must be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances involved. E.g., United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870,
64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973))."The standard for measuring the scope of a
suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
objective reasonableness-what would the typical
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reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect."Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248,250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297
(1991). Several factors may be considered in deciding
whether or not there was voluntary consent: the custodial
status, the presence of coercive police procedures, the
extent and level of the person's cooperation with the
police, awareness of the right to refuse to consent to the
search, intelligence and education, and the belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found. United States v.
Blake, 888 F.2d at 79S;UnitedStates v. Zapata, 180 F.3d
at 1241,

The Court finds that the Government has failed to meet its
burden in this case of showing that Defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to his seizure by opening the door to
the motel room. Applying the Schneckloth factors to the
record in this case, we readily find that almost all the
relevant factors support the Defendant's position that he
did not voluntarily open the door to talk with the officers.
Instead, the record shows that Defendant submitted to the
officer's command to open the motel room door. The
typical reasonable person would have done the same
thing-submit to the officer's lawful authority and open the
door as they directed.

The Court's findings of fact show that Defendant opened
the door in response to repeated commands from Office
Rivera of the Homestead Police Department to do so.
Those commands followed an unsuccessful attempt to
coerce Defendant to open the door through a ruse of a
drug buy. When a suspicious Defendant did not take the
bait, and told the person at the door to "go away," the
officers identified themselves as officers, told Defendant
they wanted to talk with him, and instructed him to "open
the door." After several attempts went unanswered, the
officers persisted. As Detective Hosch testified, Officer
Rivera told Defendant to "open the door" several times.
That is when Defendant opened the door. All evidence
points in the direction of acquiescence to lawful authority,
and not to a free and voluntary decision.
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The only Schneckloth/Blake factor that militates in favor
of voluntariness is the custodial status of Defendant. He
was not in custody at the time he consented to the officers'
seizure. The other factors, however, all point in the
direction of coercion. First, coercive police procedures
were used through the repeated and persistent requests by
the officers for him to open the door. Even after Defendant
refused to open the door when the officers pretended to be
drug purchasers, the officers persisted in their attempts to
get him to open the door. They did not make a request;
they conveyed a command. Second, the Defendant's extent
and level of cooperation with police shows that he did not
eagerly cooperate with the officers. To the contrary, even
though he ultimately opened the door, he did so holding a
weapon. Though highly dangerous and, frankly, stupid,
that conduct hardly constitutes "voluntariness." He wisely
relented and obeyed the command to drop his weapon, but
by that point he was already seized-without a warrant.
Third, no officer testified that they ever conveyed to
Defendant that he had the right not to open the door, or to
talk with them only through the door. The officers'
testimony conceded that they told him instead to "open the
door" and "come out."

*5 Applying the appropriate factors to measure the totality
of circumstances in this case, the only reasonable
conclusion that can be drawn is that the Government failed
to show that Defendant freely and voluntarily, without
coercion or intimidation, opened the door to his motel
room. The Government thus cannot show that valid
consent existed as a substitute for a warrant in this case.FN1

FN1. The remaining Blake factor, the
Defendant's intelligence and education, is
essentially neutral given that no related evidence
was introduced by either party at the hearing. If
anything, the absence of any indication that
Defendant lacked intelligence or education to
understand the choice he purportedly had points
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in favor of the Government's showing of
voluntariness. When measured against the other
factors that strongly point in the opposite
direction, neither this factor nor the Defendant's
custodial status is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness in this case.

Support for Defendant's position, and the Court's findings,
is plentiful. The facts here are most analogous to an
oft-cited Eleventh Circuit case, United States v.
Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir.1986). In
Edmondson, the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant's
consent to officers' warrantless entry into his residence
was prompted by a show of official authority rather than
uncoerced consent. Several F.B.I, agents went to a
suspect's door, with weapons drawn, identified themselves
as agents, and then ordered the suspect to open the door.
The suspect responded by opening the door, stepping back
into his house with his hands on his head, following which
the officers entered the residence and arrested the suspect.
The district court found, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed,
that the suspect's decision to open the door was
acquiescence to lawful authority even though "[t]here is no
direct evidence that defendant actually saw officers' drawn
weapons. However, the defendant was aware there were
F.B.I, agents at his door and at the bottom of the stairs.
The presence of a number of officers tends to suggest an
undertaking that is not entirely dependent on the consent
and cooperation of the suspect."M at 1515.The critical
dispositive fact in Edmondson was the particular nature of
the officers' command to the suspect. The agents did not
ask for the suspect's cooperation, did not simply ask for a
chance to talk, and did not confer any indication to the
suspect that he was free to ignore their request. Instead,
the officers' command was unequivocal-"F.B.I. agents,
open the door!"

This record evidences the same type of situation.
Following their unsuccessful ruse to get the suspect to
open the door to sell the officers narcotics, the officers did
not walk away. They did not call his room to ask him if he
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wanted to cooperate in their investigation. They did not
simply knock on the door in the normal course and merely
request that he open the door to speak with them. They
instead instructed him to do so after identifying themselves
as officers. The Defendant may have been able to see the
officer's identification through the peep hole, together with
his vest and his undrawn weapon. But even if Defendant
did not do so, the other facts in this record show the
Defendant's submission to the officers' authority rather
than "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice."United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529, 1535
(1 lth Cir. 1995). As a result, the consent exception to the
warrant requirement cannot apply.

*6 Tovar-Rico is indeed another analogous case where the
Eleventh Circuit agreed that the Government had not
satisfied its burden of showing voluntary consent. In that
case, officers also went to the home of a suspect and began
to knock loudly at the door. The officers identified
themselves through the closed door and instructed the
person inside to open the door. As soon as the door was
opened the officers rushed inside with weapons drawn and
conducted a protective sweep from which incriminating
evidence was observed. The district court suppressed that
evidence, however, based on the absence of a warrant and
the failure of the Government to show that the defendant
did not open the door simply in response to a show of
official authority. Id. at 1535-36.

An older Fifth Circuit case, binding in this Circuit, is also
instructive. See United States v. Pekar, 315 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1963). F.B.I, agents investigating the theft of luggage
knocked on a suspect's hotel room door and stated that
they wanted to speak with him regarding their
investigation. The occupant did not answer or open the
door. The agents waited and tried again. The suspect
ultimately opened the door when the officers convinced
him that they were indeed F.B.I, agents. At that point, the
officers entered the room and saw incriminating evidence.
Though the district court denied the motion to suppress
that evidence, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's
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decision to open the door was not voluntary. Id. at
325.Though the suspect clearly did not want the agents to
enter when asked, the agents persisted and continued
knocking on the door. The Court of Appeals found that the
decision to open the door was merely a response to an
"aura of officialdom." Id.

The same is true here. Defendant clearly evidenced his
intent not to open the door, initially to the purported drug
buyers and then to the officers who identified themselves
and directed that he open the door. Defendant only
acquiesced to those instructions after repeated attempts
and in response to the officers' authority, not pursuant to
voluntary consent that was a product of unconstrained
choice.

Cases outside this Circuit also support this application of
the law to similar facts. For instance, in United States v.
Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1224-1226 (10th Cir.2003),
officers who suspected the defendant was selling liquor
illegally knocked on the door of defendant's home at night
to inquire if they could purchase alcohol. After the officers
were offered wine through a hole in the wall of the home,
officers responded by telling the defendant in a firm tone
of voice, "Tulsa Police Department, open the door.'The
Court concluded that "a reasonable person, confronted by
police officers outside his door at night and a command by
one of the officers to allow them to enter, would have
believed that he had to open the door of his home and
submit to the show of authority.'The Court thus held that
"Flowers' decision to open his door was not voluntary and
he was [unlawfully] arrested while in his home."M at
1226 n. 2.

*7 Similarly, in a different case the Seventh Circuit held
that when officers knocked on a motel room door for three
minutes, identified themselves as officers, asked the
occupants to open the door, knocked on the window for
one-and-a-half to two minutes, and shined a flashlight into
the window, the subsequent opening of the door by the
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defendant was a submission to a show of authority and a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 691-93 (7th
Cir.1997). The Court concluded:

The three minutes of silence by Room 161's occupants,
when combined with the other circumstances of this
case, especially the lateness of the hour, amounted to a
refusal by Mr. Jerez and Mr. Solis to answer the door.
Once the officers had been refused admittance, their
continued efforts to rouse the occupants out of bed
certainly prevented them from ignoring the continued
requests and from maintaining the privacy and solitude
of their dwelling.

Id at 691-92 (footnote omitted).

A recent case from the Fourth Circuit also supports the
Court's conclusion here. In United States v. Mowatt, 513
F.3d 395 (4th Cir.2008), the Court reversed a narcotics
and weapons conviction based in part on an unlawful entry
into a defendant's residence. Three police officers were
dispatched to investigate a report from a private security
guard that loud music and the smell of marijuana were
emanating from a tenth-floor apartment in a high-crime
area. Once on the building's tenth floor, the officers
identified the apartment and knocked on the apartment's
closed door. Hearing no response, they began pounding on
the door, at which time they heard some movement and
noise inside. Someone then asked who was there, to which
the officers responded, "It's the police. Open the door. We
need to investigate something.'The occupants did not
open the door. But after "there was some back and forth"
between the person inside and the officers, and repeated
demands from the officers to open the door, the defendant
finally opened the door. Id. at 397-98.The officers forced
their way into the apartment after suspecting that the
occupant was holding a weapon. They then conducted a
protective sweep during which incriminating evidence was
observed. The Court of Appeals held that an unlawful

Page 7

search and seizure took place when the officers
commanded the occupants to open the door. Id. at 400.The
Court also held that no exigent circumstances existed to
justify the forced entry into the apartment and, thus, the
evidence gathered from that unlawful entry had to be
suppressed.

The Fourth Circuit found support in part for its conclusion
from an analogous Eighth Circuit case. See United States
v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir.1997) (holding
when four officers knocked on the defendants' motel door
three times, identified themselves as police, and demanded
the defendant "open up," the defendants did not
voluntarily consent to the entry).

*8 The Fourth Circuit's agreement that facts very similar
to those in Edmondson, as well as to those here, require
suppression of evidence is quite telling. There is no
material dispute among the Circuits that officers'
commands, directives, or orders to an occupant of a
dwelling to "open the door" can constitute a "seizure"
together with all other circumstances. That is based on a
well-established principle that an unconstitutional search
occurs when officers gain visual or physical access to a
motel room after an occupant opens the door involuntarily,
not consensually, in response to a demand under color of
authority. United States v. Conner, 127F.3dat663 (citing
United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d at \535-36;United
States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d at 692\UnitedStates v. Winsor,
846 F.2d 1569, 1572 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc)).

That is not to say, of course, that an officer's use of any
particular words is determinative. The appropriate analysis
still requires an examination of all the facts in their
totality. Nevertheless the particular words chosen by the
officers in context sheds significant light on whether a
reasonable person in the occupant's position would
understand the officer's statement as a request to speak
with him, or instead as a command that he must speak with
him and must open the threshold of the dwelling to the
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officer.

In this case, the officer's language was a directive, not a
request. The method in which he communicated that
directive was firm and definite, leaving little room for
interpretation. And the purpose was clear; the officers
intended all along to get the occupant to open that door.
That is why a whole team was assembled that afternoon.
As one of the officers acknowledged at the hearing:

Q: So if you're facing the door, he was standing to the left
and you guys were standing to the right if you're facing
the door?

A: Correct.
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officer telephoned the defendant's motel room, identified
himself as a police officer, and stated that he would like to
speak to the defendant face to face, to which the defendant
responded "okay." The officers then knocked on the
defendant's room, and he answered the door and said
"come in." The officer's actions in that situation are in
stark contrast to those of the Homestead Police in the
instant case. The Willis officers did not line up outside his
door in the ready position, and did not order him to "open
the door" under the color of their authority after having
previously been told to "go away." Unlike the facts in this
case, those officers had not arisen the occupant's
suspicions through a purported drug buy, which resulted
in a blanket statement that the unknown persons "go
away," followed by the officers' identifying themselves,
repeatedly knocking on the door, and ordering Defendant
to open the door. The record here shows that Defendant
obeyed an imperative order to open his door and
acquiesced to the authority of the Homestead Police.

Q: From the outside.

A: Correct.

Q: And so once he got the door open, you guys would all
be able to run into the room?

A: Correct.

*9 The Government's position relies primarily upon the
case of Tobin v. United States, 923 F.2d 1506 (11th
Cir. 1991), a case that distinguished Edmondson and
followed Willis. A close reading of Tobin shows, however,
that what the Eleventh Circuit found absent in that case-an
officer's use of imperative or directive language-is
precisely present here. The Court in Tobin actually held
that there was probable cause and exigent circumstances
to enter a residence before officers ever knocked on the
door Jd. at 1510-11 .That itself distinguishes that case from
this one.

Hearing Trans. 63:24-64:7.

There can of course be circumstances where an encounter
with a motel occupant would not rise to the level of
coerced consent. The Eleventh Circuit has found there to
be valid consent when officers act in a manner that allows
a defendant to make an unfettered decision, free from a
show of official authority. For instance, in United States
v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1493,1498 (11th Cir.1985), the

As an alternative analysis, the Court proceeded to consider
whether the occupant of a residence voluntarily opened the
front door to the officers. The Court acknowledged that
"[i]f the circumstances indicate that [the occupant] opened
the door in response to a "show of official authority," then
[he] cannot be deemed to have consented to the agent's
obtaining the olfactory evidence indicating the presence of
marijuana. Edmondson, 791 F.2dat 1515."W. at 1512The
Court found, however, that the circumstances in that case
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were not like those in Edmondson because "[i]n calling
out to the occupants of the house, the agent did not use the
imperative as did the officer in Edmondson.On the
contrary, he phrased his words in the form of a request.
The occupants were free to deny that request or
alternatively talk to the agent through the closed door. The
decision to open the door was therefore voluntary."M

This case, like the case that the Eleventh Circuit decided
four years after Tobin, United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61
F.3d at 1535, involves clearly imperative language. As
discussed earlier, Tovar-Rico held that voluntary consent
was lacking when officers went to the home of a suspect,
began to knock loudly at the door, identified themselves
through the closed door as officers, and instructed the
person inside to open the door. The same circumstances
occurred here. Based on the testimony of the officers at
the evidentiary hearing, the Court finds that there was no
"request" to talk with the officers; instead, the officers
directed that the occupant "come out" and "open the
door." This finding clearly distinguishes the facts here
from Tobin, and falls within the scope of the decisions in
Edmondson and Tovar-Rico.
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he told the Defendant to "come out." The manner in which
Detective Rivera testified on the stand and described how
he told the Defendant to come out evidenced an
imperative, not a request. His testimony was thus not
materially different from Detective Hosch's. To the extent
it was, however, the Court finds that Detective Hosch's
testimony was more credible, and less equivocating.
Detective Hosch, the team leader of the operation who
stood right behind Detective Rivera, testified that he
clearly heard what Detective Rivera said. He testified that
the Defendant was instructed to "open the door." Despite
repeated questioning, Detective Hosch never altered that
testimony. The Court thus predicates its finding that the
officers ordered the Defendant to open the door based on
that testimony.

Again, however, we do not conclude that Detective Rivera
was testifying materially differently. He tried to minimize
how sternly he gave the instruction. But his testimony as
a whole is fully consistent with the Court's finding that the
instructions the officers gave Defendant were in the form
of an imperative command, not an inquisitive request.

The Government also tried to suggest at the hearing that
there was a conflict between the testimony of Detective
Rivera and Detective Hosch. The Government maintained
that Detective Rivera never expressed any command or
directive for the occupant to open the door. Rather, the
Government argued, he simply requested to speak with the
Defendant. That stood in stark contrast to Detective
Hosch's testimony, which clearly supported the
Defendant's argument that he was ordered to open the
door. Detective Hosch said that the officers repeatedly
told the Defendant to "open the door." The Government
thus concludes in its supplemental memorandum that the
facts here fall more in line with Tobin.

Moreover, the argument that the facts here are like Tobin's
ignores the reality of the situation. The officers in Tobin
were not sent on a specific mission to get the Defendant to
open the door. They were, instead, conducting
surveillance of a residence. Only after they observed
incriminating activity did they conclude that they wanted
to speak to the residents. Then as they approached, and
before they ever knocked on the door, they smelled
marijuana emanating from the house. As the Eleventh
Circuit found, the officers had probable cause at that
moment to enter the residence. The fact that they tried to
conduct a "knock and talk" before doing so was just an
additional basis for the Court to hold that no Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred.

*10 The Court finds, however, that the officers' testimony
is easily reconciled. Detective Rivera clearly testified that

Here, however, the officers testified that their purpose was
to obtain entry into the motel room. Though they had
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every right to conduct a "knock and talk" operation, that
is not what they did. The instead tried a different
approach-a ruse to get the Defendant to open the door to
sell them drugs, at which point they would rush in and
arrest him. The ruse did not work and the Defendant told
them to go away. Having raised the Defendant's
suspicions, the Defendant did not open the door when they
identified themselves as Homestead police officers. Only
after several commands that he "open the door" did the
Defendant open the door slightly, with gun in hand.
Perhaps the Defendant was concerned that the persons
outside the motel room door were not officers, but instead
other drug merchants looking to rob him. Regardless, his
conduct did not evidence a voluntary decision to open that
door. It instead evidenced a submission to the officers'
imperative instructions.

*11 Finally, the Court of course does not excuse what
Defendant did that afternoon. Yet we must also
acknowledge that the officers in this case breached an
important constitutional line. Without a warrant issued by
a dispassionate magistrate judge, the officers forcibly
coerced a person to open a door to his dwelling under
color of law. That requires the Court to suppress the
evidence that was immediately gathered as a result of that
warrantless entry, no matter how minimal that entry was.
As Justice Scalia puts it, "any physical invasion of the
structure of the home 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was
too much ... and there is certainly no exception to the
warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks
open the front door and sees nothing but the nonintimate
rug on the vestibule floor. In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes."A^y//o v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 512, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)).

Therefore, consent cannot be used as a substitute for a
warrant in this case. The Government had a heavy burden
to show that a warrant was not necessary. The Government
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failed to meet that burden because the opening of the door
was not an unequivocal, intentional, and uncontaminated
act free of coercion. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at
A91\Floridav. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. The officers here
conducted an unconstitutional search and seizure by
gaining visual and physical access to the motel room
through the occupant's response to a demand under color
of authority. See, e.g., United States v. Edmondson, 791
F.2d at \5\5\United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at
397-98',UnitedStates v. Flowers, 336F.3dat \226\United
States v. Conner, 127 F.3d at 665-66\United States v.
Jerez, 108 F.3d at 692.

We note here that no other exception to the warrant
requirement applies in this case. The Government did not
argue in its supplemental memorandum, to its credit, that
any exigent circumstances were present prior to
Defendant's opening of the door.FN2We are, hence, left
with a situation where the officers created the exigency by
coercing the Defendant to open the door. It is well settled
that valid exigent circumstances do not exist where the
officers themselves create the exigency. See, e.g., United
States v. Santa, 236 F.3d at 669-70. The tainted
evidence-the gun, the drugs, and the statements-must be
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.™3

FN2. Indeed, the Government never even argued
that probable cause existed with which it could
obtain a warrant to begin with. The Government
always argued that the officers' actions were
warranted only based upon Defendant's voluntary
opening of the door. Defendant, ironically,
conceded at the hearing that probable cause did
exist to obtain a warrant solely based upon the
tip the officers obtained. The Court, like the
Government, is not so sure. Regardless, however,
the Defendant's concession is inconsequential
because both the Defendant and the Government
agree that exigent circumstances could not be
shown without Defendant consensually opening
the motel room door.
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*12 DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami,
Florida, this 9th day of September, 2008.
FN3. The Government, again to its credit, has
not argued that even if the officers' entry was
unlawful the evidence or the statements should
not be suppressed because intervening
circumstances dissipated the taint. Undoubtedly
the circumstances in this case do not allow for
such an argument because the factors required to
find attenuation cannot be found here. See Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The illegal entry here
quickly led to the seizure of the evidence and the
incriminating statements. There was no sufficient
lapse between the illegality and the acquisition of
the evidence to ignore the illegal entry by not
suppressing the evidence.

S.D.Fla.,2008.
U.S. v. Arrington
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4459378 (S.D.Fla.)

END OF DOCUMENT

///. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED
that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements and
Physical Evidence [D.E. 24] be GRANTED.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have
Jive (5) business days (until September 16,2008) to serve
and file written objections, if any, with the Honorable
Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge. The
Court is expediting any objections to this Report and
Recommendation based upon the imminent trial date and
pursuant to S.D. Fla. Local Mag.J. R. 4(a). Failure to
timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo
determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in
the report and bar the parties from attacking on appeal the
factual findings contained herein. R.T.C. v. Hallmark
Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir.1993);
LoContev. Dugger, 847F.2d745 (1 \thCir.\98S); Nettles
v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)
(en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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Affirmed.
This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter.
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United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Anthony R. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 06-3092.

Sept. 11,2007.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas of
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance,
and he appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jerome A. Holmes,
Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) purported inconsistencies in police officer's testimony
did not support conclusion that district court clearly erred
in finding officer's testimony credible;
(2) district court did not clearly err in finding defendant's
consent to a search to be voluntary; and
(3) court did not clearly err in finding that officer did not
exceed the scope of defendant's consent to search.

[1] Criminal Law 110 €^>394.6(4)

110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency in General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.6 Motions Challenging
Admissibility of Evidence
110k394.6(4) k. Evidence on Motion.
Most Cited Cases
Purported inconsistencies in police officer's testimony at
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress cocaine found
in closet of residence did not support conclusion that
district court clearly erred in finding officer's testimony
credible; officer's testimony that he found cocaine in clear
bag, and his later clarification that clear bag of cocaine
was inside white, opaque bag, did not impugn officer's
credibility, and although officer testified at hearing that he
had some difficulty communicating with defendant
because defendant did not speak English well, and
testified at trial that he did not recall having difficulty
communicating with defendant, he consistently maintained
that he called interpreter to residence in order to
communicate with people inside house, not defendant.

[2] Searches and Seizures 349 €=>184

349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349k 179 Validity of Consent
349kl84 k. Custody, Restraint, or Detention
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Issues. Most Cited Cases
The fact that defendant was in police custody at time he
consented to search of closet containing his personal
belongings was not dispositive as to the voluntariness of
his consent. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[3] Searches and Seizures 349 €^=>181

349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349k 179 Validity of Consent
349kl81 k. Particular Concrete Applications.
Most Cited Cases
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress cocaine found
in closet of residence, district court did not clearly err in
finding defendant's consent to a search of the closet to be
voluntary, despite defendant's alleged intoxication ait the
time he consented; defendant understood and responded to
officers' questions and even offered a narrative explaining
why he was running down the street when officer first saw
him, and two officers testified that they did not smell
alcohol on defendant's breath and that defendant's actions
and demeanor did not indicate that he had been drinking.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[4] Searches and Seizures 349 €=>186

349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl86 k. Scope and Duration of Consent;
Withdrawal. Most Cited Cases
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress cocaine found
in closet of residence, district court did not clearly err in
finding that police officer did not exceed the scope of
defendant's consent to search of the closet by opening an
opaque shopping bag found in the closet; officer told
defendant that they needed to establish his identity and
requested permission to search his belongings in the closet
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for identification, the plastic shopping bag discovered by
officer in the closet reasonably could have contained a
receipt or other identifying information, and officer was
feeling the pockets of clothes when he found the bag
among folded clothes. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
*956 D. Blair Watson, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Brent I.
Anderson, Office of the United *957 States Attorney,
Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John K. Henderson, Jr., Office of the Federal Public
Defender District of Kansas, Wichita, KS, for
Defendant-Appellant.

Before O'BRIEN, HOLLO WAY, and HOLMES, Circuit
Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

FN* This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.
R. 32.1.
JEROME A. HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

**1 Defendant-Appellant Anthony R. Romero was
convicted by a jury of three counts of possession with
intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and sentenced to 160 months in
prison. Mr. Romero appeals the district court's denial of
his motion to suppress evidence related to the third
count-specifically, the cocaine found during an April 10,
2005 police search of a closet containing Mr. Romero's
personal belongings. We exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
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I. BACKGROUND
At approximately 2:00 A.M. on April 10, 2005, Wichita,
Kansas police officers responded to a call from a neighbor
reporting a domestic disturbance at 1802 South Madison.
Sergeant Espinoza was one of at least five officers who
responded to the domestic disturbance call. Sgt. Espinoza
was standing outside the residence when he saw Mr.
Romero, a Hispanic male, running southbound on an
adjoining street. Sgt. Espinoza followed Mr. Romero and
found him hiding in bushes. Drawing his gun, Sgt.
Espinoza ordered Mr. Romero out of the bushes, patted
him down, and instructed him to sit on the curb.

Although Sgt. Espinoza was able to converse with Mr.
Romero, he testified at the suppression hearing that Mr.
Romero's English was not very good and he had
experienced some difficulty communicating with him. Sgt.
Espinoza called for a Spanish-speaking officer to come to
the residence due to the possibility that the residents of the
house did not speak English well and to make sure he was
"covering all the bases." Moreover, Sgt. Espinoza testified
that Mr. Romero did not smell of alcohol and his
demeanor and actions did not indicate that he had been
drinking.

Mr. Romero falsely identified himself as "Jose Gonzales."
He told Sgt. Espinoza that he and his brother had been
involved in a bar fight and that he was running from
people who had injured his brother. Mr. Romero claimed
that his brother was at a nearby residence, but he could not
remember which house. Sgt. Espinoza called dispatch to
verify this account and was informed that no disturbance
had been reported from any bar in the area. At this time,
Officers Boone and Shelton arrived on the scene and
stayed with Mr. Romero while Sgt. Espinoza returned to
the residence, where no one had yet gained access to the
house. After several other officers knocked on the door
and windows of the residence, Ms. Michelle Montoya
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eventually answered and let the officers into the residence.
The officers quickly checked the residence and determined
that Ms. Montoya and three children were the only ones
present in the residence.

Meanwhile two blocks away, Officer Boone asked Mr.
Romero for his name and *958 date of birth. Mr. Romero
responded that his name was "Jose Gonzales" and that he
was born April 27, 1978. Officer Boone also asked Mr.
Romero if he had ever been in jail and Mr. Romero
answered affirmatively. Officer Boone ran the name "Jose
Gonzales" through the SPIDER identification database to
check if there were any outstanding warrants. However,
the database did not locate any individual by that name. At
the suppression hearing, Officer Boone testified that he
asked Mr. Romero his name at least three times during this
encounter, and all three times, Mr. Romero identified
himself as "Jose Gonzales." Mr. Romero also told Officer
Boone the same account of how his brother was injured
and that his brother was in a nearby house.

**2 Sgt. Espinoza radioed Officer Boone requesting him
to ask Mr. Romero if he was willing to come to the
residence at the 1800 block of Madison. Officer Boone
drove Mr. Romero approximately two blocks to the
residence. Mr. Romero rode in the back of the patrol car,
but Officer Boone did not handcuff him. At the residence,
the officers continued their attempts to ascertain Mr.
Romero's identity. After being informed that he could face
charges for giving the officers a false name, Mr. Romero
identified himself as "Victor Gonzales" and stated that his
date of birth was July 7, 1978.

At Sgt. Espinoza's request, Ms. Montoya agreed to come
out of the house to see if she could identify Mr. Romero.
Ms. Montoya identified Mr. Romero as her boyfriend,
Anthony Romero. Sgt. Espinoza was familiar with the
name "Anthony Romero" from his previous work in the
Narcotics Division, and consequently, suspected Mr.
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Romero of dealing drugs. However, Mr. Romero
steadfastly maintained that his name was "Victor
Gonzales," and not "Anthony Romero." The officers ran
the name "Anthony Romero" in the SPIDER database and
determined that there were two outstanding felony arrest
warrants. Upon learning of the outstanding warrants, the
officers handcuffed Mr. Romero in the back of the patrol
car. When Mr. Romero still insisted he was not "Anthony
Romero," the officers asked him whether he had any
identification inside the residence. Mr. Romero claimed
that he thought he might have something inside the house
proving that he was, in fact, "Victor Gonzales."

Inside the residence, Sgt Espinoza informed Ms, Montoya
that he suspected Mr. Romero of having drugs in the
house and asked for her permission to search the house.
Ms. Montoya agreed, but expressly stated that Mr.
Romero kept his belongings in a closet and that the
officers would have to get Mr. Romero's permission to
search that area. Sgt. Espinoza returned outside and told
Mr. Romero that they needed to establish his identity and
requested permission to search his belongings in the closet
for identification. According to the officers, Mr. Romero
agreed to the search. Although Sgt. Espinoza wanted to
search for drugs in addition to the identification, he did
not inform Mr. Romero of his suspicions regarding drug
activity.

After obtaining Mr. Romero's oral consent, Sgt. Espinoza
began searching Mr. Romero's closet which was located in
a hallway between two bedrooms. Inside the closet, there
were some clothes on hangers and some clothes folded on
shelves. Beginning with the top shelf, Sgt Espinoza began
lifting up the folded shirts, looking underneath, and feeling
any pockets to see if they contained identification. *959 In
between the folded clothes, Sgt. Espinoza discovered a
white, non-transparent, "Wal-Mart type" shopping bag.
Opening the shopping bag, Sgt. Espinoza saw a clear
plastic bag containing what appeared to be rocks of
crack-cocaine. After finding the bag, Sgt. Espinoza
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continued to search the closet for identification. He found
various items including a police citation issued to
"Anthony Romero" and pay stubs bearing the same name.

**3 On May 3, 2005, Mr. Romero was charged with one
count of unlawfully possessing, with intent to distribute,
fifty grams or more of a mixture containing detectable
amounts of cocaine base.™ Mr. Romero filed a motion to
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police officers
unlawfully searched the closet. On September 22, 2005,
the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr.
Romero's Motion to Suppress. Sgt. Espinoza, Officer
Boone, and another officer who responded to the domestic
disturbance call, Officer Izzard, testified at the hearing.
Mr. Romero and Ms. Montoya also testified.

FN1. On September 21, 2005 in a superseding
indictment, Mr. Romero was charged with three
counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute
427 grams of marijuana on December 12, 2003;
(2) possession with intent to distribute 5,235
grams of marijuana on June 17, 2004; and (3)
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of
cocaine base on April 10, 2005. This appeal is
limited to reviewing the district court's denial of
Mr. Romero's motion to suppress evidence
related to Count 3.

Following the district court's denial of Mr. Romero's
Motion to Suppress, Mr. Romero stood trial. On
December 9, 2005, the jury found Mr. Romero guilty on
all three counts. The district court sentenced Mr. Romero
to a term of 160 months in prison. Mr. Romero timely
filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION
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In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
(as the prevailing party) and accept the district court's
factual findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v.
Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 698 (10th Cir.2007). A finding is
clearly erroneous when it is "without factual support in the
record or we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made." United States v. Cernobyl,
255 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotations
omitted). The ultimate question of the reasonableness of
a search, however, is reviewed de novo. Trotter, 483 F.3d
at 698.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.. .."U.S.
Const, amend. IV. Indeed, "physical entry into the home
is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is
directed." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104
S.Ct. 2091,80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (quoting United States
v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mick, 407 U.S. 297,
313,92 S.Ct. 2125,32L.Ed.2d752 (1972)). Accordingly,
warrantless searches and seizures conducted inside a home
are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980);
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98, 78 S.Ct.
1253,2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958).™ Nevertheless, the Fourth
Amendment allows the warrantless search of a home when
law enforcement officials obtain the voluntary consent of
an individual with *960 actual or apparent authority.
Georgiav. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109,126 S.Ct. 1515,
164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)
and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93
S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).

FN2. As Justice Jackson cogently explained, the
rationale underlying the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of a warrant is that the determination
as to "[w]hen the right of privacy must
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.
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reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a [neutral and detached]
judicial officer, not by a policeman or
Government enforcement agent." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367,
92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

On appeal, Mr. Romero claims that he did not consent to
the search of the closet. Additionally, Mr. Romero
contends that any consent given was involuntary because:
(1) he was in police custody and handcuffed in the back of
a patrol car at the time of his alleged consent; (2) he had
been drinking heavily prior to the incident; and (3) he was
deceived by the police officer who told him they were
looking for identification and failed to inform him of the
real purpose of the search, i.e., to look for drugs. Finally,
Mr. Romero argues that the officer exceeded the scope of
his alleged consent to search for identification by opening
an opaque shopping bag in which the cocaine was
ultimately found. Each of these arguments lacks merit.

A. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding
that Mr. Romero Gave the Officers Consent to Search.

**4 [1] After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district
court found that Mr. Romero "unequivocally" gave Sgt.
Espinoza consent to search the closet. R. Vol. I, Doc. 25
at 6-7. Notwithstanding Mr. Romero's claim at the
suppression hearing that he never gave the officers
permission to search for identification, the district court
found that during his August 2, 2005 interrogation by
police, Mr. Romero stated that he could not remember
whether he gave officers permission to search.
Accordingly, the district court found that Sgt. Espinoza's
testimony was more credible than that of Mr. Romero on
the issue of consent.

The government bears the burden of proving, by a
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preponderance of the evidence, that unequivocal and
specific consent was obtained. United States v. Guerrero,
All F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir.2007) (requiring "clear and
positive testimony that consent was unequivocal and
specific"). u[T]he credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given the evidence, together with the
inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn from
the evidence, are all matters most appropriate for
resolution by the district court." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Accord United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509,
1513 (10th Cir.1990) ("Assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is the prerogative of the trial court, not an
appellate court, which neither sees nor hears the
witnesses.") Accordingly, determinations of witness
credibility will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous. "This holds particularly true where, as here, the
credibility of witnesses is important on the issue of
voluntariness [of consent to search]." Guerrero, All F.3d
at 789 (internal quotations omitted).

Mr. Romero argues that the district court's credibility
determination regarding Sgt. Espinoza is clearly erroneous
because "[o]n two occasions, he was untruthful to the
Court." Aplt. Opening Br. at 9. We disagree.

In the first cited instance, which occurred during the
suppression hearing, *961 Sgt. Espinoza testified on direct
examination that he found the cocaine in a clear bag
between folded clothes in the closet. Contrary to Mr.
Romero's assertions, Sgt. Espinoza did not testify that the
cocaine was in plain view as he sorted through the folded
clothing. Subsequently, in response to more detailed
questioning on cross-examination, Sgt. Espinoza clarified
that the clear bag of cocaine was inside a white, opaque
"Wal-Marttype" shopping bag. Such a clarification hardly
impugns Sgt. Espinoza's credibility. We discern nothing in
this example that would lead us to conclude that the
district court's credibility determination is clearly
erroneous.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.
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In the second instance, Mr. Romero asserts that Sgt.
Espinoza contradicted himself regarding the need for an
interpreter. At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Espinoza
testified that he had some difficulty communicating with
Mr. Romero because Mr. Romero did not speak English
well. Two months later at Mr. Romero's trial, Sgt.
Espinoza testified that he did not recall having difficulty
communicating with Mr. Romero.

**5 After reviewing the transcript of the suppression
hearing, however, Sgt. Espinoza conceded that initially he
did have some difficulty communicating with Mr. Romero.
Yet, Sgt. Espinoza consistently maintained that he called
the Spanish-language interpreter to the residence in order
to communicate with the individuals inside the house, not
Mr. Romero. These purported "inconsistencies" in Sgt.
Espinoza's testimony do not support a conclusion that the
district court clearly erred in finding his testimony to be
credible.

In sum, insofar as it rests on Sgt. Espinoza's alleged lack
of veracity, Mr. Romero's challenge to the district court's
credibility finding is wholly without merit. See United
States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th
Cir.2006) (seeing "no reason not to defer to the court's
credibility determination" where district court credits law
enforcement officer's testimony over that of defendant
(emphasis added)), cert, denied,— U.S. -—, 127 S.Ct.
1027, 166 L.Ed.2d 773 (2007).™

FN3. Mr. Romero suggests that it would defy
logic to believe that he would have granted
consent under the circumstances: "[t]here is no
logical reason to believe that he would [consent]
if [the closet] contained cocaine." Aplt. Opening
Br. at 15. However, the case law is replete with
examples of individuals consenting to a search
that later reveals evidence of contraband,
attesting to the fact that people do not always
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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behave logically. See, e.g., United States v.
Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890, 892 (10th Cir.2006)
(consensual search of defendant's business
revealed stolen motorcycle engines), cert,
denied,-' U.S. — , 127 S.Ct. 156, 166 L.Ed.2d
39 (2006); United States v. Rosborough, 366
F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir.2004) (consensual
search of defendant's vehicle revealed 30 pounds
of cocaine).

L.Ed.2d 854(1973) (rejecting rule requiring individuals to
be informed of their right to refuse consent). More
specifically, citing Robinette, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that a signed consent-to-search form was not a prerequisite
for establishing the voluntariness of consent. United States
v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir.1997).
Accordingly, Mr. Romero's newly-spawned contention of
error regarding the officers' failure to get his written
consent is not plain, and we therefore will not consider it.

Finally, Mr. Romero argues, for the first time on appeal,
that the failure to provide a consent-to-search form
supports giving him the benefit of the doubt that he did
not, in fact, consent, unless there is some justification for
why the consent was not documented. As support, Mr.
Romero argues that "[a]s a matter of policy, law
enforcement should be held to a higher burden of
verification or documentation when obtaining consent to
search a home." Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. Mr. Romero
cites no authority to undergird this proposition, however.

B. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding
that Mr. Romero Voluntarily Consented to the Search
of the Closet.

Generally, absent plain error resulting in manifest
injustice, we will not consider issues that are raised for the
first time on appeal. See United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d
676, 681 (10th Cir,2007); United States v. On, 864 F.2d
1505, 1508-09 (10th Cir.1988). Any error here is hardly
plain.

Consent is a factual issue to be determined by the totality
of the circumstances, *962 not by per se rules. In other
words, no one factor-including the execution of a
consent-to-search form-is dispositive. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has twice rejected per se rules in determining the
validity of a consent to search. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)
(rejecting rule requiring "police officers to always inform
detainees that they are free to go before a consent to
search may be deemed voluntary"); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,227,248-49,93 S.Ct. 2041,36

**6 [2] Mr. Romero also challenges the district court's
ruling that he voluntarily consented to the search claiming
that: (1) he was in custody in handcuffs in the back seat of
a patrol car; (2) he had been drinking heavily prior to the
incident; and (3) he was deceived by the police officer
who told him officers were looking for identification and
did not mention any suspicion of drug activity.™4

FN4. On appeal, Mr. Romero does not argue that
his consent was involuntary because of language
barriers. Any "communication barrier" Mr.
Romero refers to involves his allegation that he
had been drinking heavily. Mr. Romero's
arguments regarding the need for an interpreter
all bear on the issue of Sgt. Espinoza's
credibility. It is only in his reply brief that Mr.
Romero seems to argue that the language barrier
provides a basis for finding involuntary consent.
"Failure to raise an issue in the opening appellate
brief waives that issue." United States v. Black,
369 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.2004). In any
event, Mr. Romero's contention is unpersuasive.
The district court specifically noted that
"[although the defendant may not be completely
fluent in English, the evidence persuades the
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court that the defendant understood the request,
that he was able to communicate his thoughts to
the officer, and he made a decision of his own
free will to grant permission to search the closet
for his identification." R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 7.
These findings are not clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Contreras, 372 F.3d 974,
977-78 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that defendant's
difficulties with English did not prevent him
from voluntarily consenting to a search of his
home).

The government bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the individual
voluntarily consented-"a burden that is not satisfied by
showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority."
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The government must demonstrate
that consent was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied. See United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 562
(10th Cir. 1992). The question of whether an individual has
voluntarily consented to a search is a question of fact that
the district court must evaluate under the totality of the
circumstances. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40, 117 S.Ct.
417; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see
also Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d at 1265 (observing that
voluntariness of consent is a question of fact which is
reviewed under the highly deferential clearly-erroneous
standard); United States v. Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890., 895
(10th Cir.2006) (a[T]he federal test for determining*963
the validity of consent to search requires a factual
determination based upon the totality of the circumstances
of whether the consent was the product of an 'essentially
free and unconstrained choice by [the] maker' or whether
it was the product of 'duress or coercion, express or
implied.' ") (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93
S.Ct. 2m\cert. denied,-- U.S. —-, 127 S.Ct. 156, 166
L.Ed.2d 39 (2006). Factors to consider within the totality
of circumstances include:
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• the threatening presence of several officers;

• the display or brandishing of weapons;

• some physical touching by an officer;

• use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with an officer's request is compulsory;

• prolonged retention of personal effects such as
identification, plane or bus tickets;

• request to accompany officer to the station;

• interaction in a nonpublic place;

• absence of other members of the public;

• the administration of Miranda warnings;

• use of physical violence;

• oral threats;

• promises, inducements, deception, trickery;

• the physical and mental condition and capacity of they
defendant; and
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• whether the police informed defendant of the right to
refuse consent.

See Guerrero, 472 F.3d at 790; Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 895;
United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1500 (10th
Cir.1996).

Addressing Mr. Romero's first argument, the fact that Mr.
Romero was in custody is not dispositive as to the
voluntariness of his consent. See United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)
(u[T]he fact of custody alone has never been enough in
itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to
search."). "Consent to search may be voluntary, even
though the consenting party is being detained at the time
consent is given." United States v. Doyle, 129 F.3d 1372,
\377 (\0thCivA997). Accord United States v. Dozal, 173
F.3d 787, 796 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Soto, 988
F.2d 1548,1557 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Valid consent may be
given by a person being detained."). A court must look to
all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the
consent to search was freely given by an individual under
arrest. See United States v. Shields, 573 F.2d 18,23 (10th
Cir. 1978).

**7 Applying the factors enumerated above, the district
court found that although Mr. Romero was in custody at
the time he gave consent, the totality of the circumstances
did not warrant a finding that Mr. Romero's consent was
coerced. Specifically, the court observed that:

the defendant was on a public street in front of his home
..., and the officers did not use any overt display offeree
or coercion to gain the consent. The interaction between
the officer and the defendant was cordial and courteous
at the time of the request. And although the officers did
not inform the defendant that he had a right to refuse a
search, the manner in which the officer sought consent
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conveyed that he was seeking the defendant's
permission for a search and that the defendant was not
obligated to give consent. Moreover, the evidence*964
shows that the defendant is a competent adult who
understood the circumstances and the nature of the
officer's request.

R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 7. In our view, the district court
properly considered the fact that Mr. Romero was in
custody along with the rest of the circumstances in
concluding that Mr. Romero voluntarily consented to the
search.

[3] Second, Mr. Romero argues that his heavy drinking
prior to the incident rendered his consent involuntary. The
district court found that "despite testimony of the
defendant and his girlfriend about how much alcohol the
defendant drank prior to the incident, there is no credible
evidence that defendant's ability to understand or make a
voluntary decision was impaired to any significant degree
by alcohol." R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 7. On appeal, Mr.
Romero fails to show why this conclusion is clearly
erroneous.

In United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1985), we
held that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search
of his glove box even though his drug intoxication made
him slur his speech, stagger, sway, and use his vehicle to
support himself. Id. at 377 (recognizing "different degrees
of intoxication" where an individual "can be too
intoxicated to operate a motor vehicle, but rational enough
to understand requests and to give plausible
explanations"). In this case, Mr. Romero understood and
responded to Sgt. Espinoza's and Officer Boone's
questions and even offered a narrative explaining why he
was running down the street. Both officers also testified
that they did not smell alcohol on Mr. Romero's breath and
that Mr. Romero's actions and demeanor did not indicate
that he had been drinking. Accordingly, the district court
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properly weighed the evidence and did not clearly err m
finding Mr Romero's consent to be voluntary, despite his
alleged intoxication

Third, Mr Romero claims that Sgt Espmoza's
"deception" and "trickery" regarding the object of the
search rendered his consent invalid Aplt Opening Br at
16-17 When assessing the voluntariness of consent, the
use of deception or trickery is one factor to be considered
m the totality of the circumstances Sawyer 441 F 3d at
895 However, under the facts present here, this factor is
of no moment

**8 Sgt Espmoza truthfully told Mr Romero that he
wanted to look for proof confirming his identity He
simply did not go further and tell Mr Romero he also was
looking for evidence of drug-dealing Even if this
omission could be construed as evincing deceit, it would
not be the kmd of deceit that would have the capacity on
these facts to erode the strong foundation of Mr Romero's
otherwise voluntary consent See United States v White
706F 2d 806,807-08 (7th Cir 1983) (holdmg that officer's
subjective intent to search for money did not render
involuntary a defendant's consent to search for drugs) Cf
United States v Kimoana 383 F 3d 1215, 1224 (10th
Cir 2004) ( "Although the officers executing the search
were looking for weapons rather than the vehicle key, the
subjective motivation of the officers executing the search
is irrelevant")FN5 Accordingly the district court did not
commit *965 clear error in its determination of
voluntariness

FN5 Mr Romero's argument that Sgt Espmoza
was familiar with an individual by the name of
"Anthony Romero," and therefore, had no need
to confirm Mr Romero's identity is belied by the
fact that Mr Romero steadfastly maintained that
he was not Anthony Romero Moreover, even
after finding the drugs, Sgt Espmoza continued
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to look for identification bearing the name
"Anthony Romero "

C. The Officers Did Not Exceed the Scope of Mr.
Romerofs Consent in Opening up the Plastic Shopping
Bag in the Closet.

[4] Mr Romero also argues that Sgt Espmoza exceeded
the scope of any alleged consent when he opened an
opaque shopping bag found m the closet

"The scope of a search is generally defined by its
expressed object" Florida v Jimeno 500 U S 248, 251,
111 SCt 1801, 114 LEd2d 297 (1991) Accord
Kimoana 383 F 3d at 1223 Additionally, "the scope of
the consent determines the permissible scope of the
search " United States v Marquez 337 F 3d 1203, 1207
(10th Cir 2003) Accord United States v West 219 F 3d
1171, 1177 (10th Cir 2000) In determining the scope of
the consent, courts apply an objective-reasonableness test
"[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?" Jimeno 500 U S at 251, 111 SCt 1801
(finding it objectively reasonable for police to conclude
that general consent to search defendant s car for drugs
included consent to search paper bag on floor of car which
might reasonably have contained drugs) Moreover,
consent to search for specific items includes consent to
search those areas and containers that might reasonably
contain those items Id Finally, whether a search remains
withm the boundaries of consent is a question of fact to be
determined by the totality of circumstances, and a district
court's findings will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous See Kimoana 383 F 3d at 1223, West 219
F 3d at 1177 ("The court determines from the totality of
the circumstances whether a search remams withm the
boundaries of the consent, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government")
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In this case, a reasonable person would have understood
the exchange between Sgt. Espinoza and Mr. Romero to
mean that Mr. Romero was granting permission to search
anywhere in the closet for identification. The plastic
shopping bag discovered by Sgt. Espinoza in the closet
reasonably could have contained a receipt or other
identifying information. Mr. Romero disputes that one
could reasonably believe that identifying information
could be found where Sgt. Espinoza discovered the
bag-that is, among folded (possibly clean) clothes. But we
do not share Mr. Romero's doubt.
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We conclude that the district court did not commit clear
error in finding that Mr. Romero unequivocally and
voluntarily consented to the search and that the search did
not exceed the scope of Mr. Romero's consent. Therefore,
we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

C.A.10 (Kan.),2007.
U.S. v. Romero
247 Fed.Appx. 955, 2007 WL 2694242 (C.A.10 (Kan.))

END OF DOCUMENT
**9 Sgt. Espinoza was feeling the pockets of the clothes
when he found the bag. Clothing pockets reasonably could
be viewed as possible locations of identifying information.
Cf Marquez, 337 F.3d at 1208-09 (holding it was
objectively reasonable for police to conclude that the
general consent to search defendant's recreational vehicle
for drugs and guns included consent to search
compartment under bench seat of vehicle where drugs and
guns could reasonably have been stored); United States v.
Tirado, 313 F.3d 437, 440 (8th Cir.2002) (searching
defendant's bedroom closet and bag hanging in the closet
was not beyond scope of consent to search where
defendant did not limit the scope of the search of his
bedroom); United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139,
1146-47 (10th Cir.2002) (upholding officer's removal of
speaker grill covers as not exceeding scope of general
consent to search car); West, 219 F.3d at 1178 (affirming
district court's *966 conclusion that consent given by
defendant to search car for drugs and firearms reasonably
included consent to search the trunk and the containers
which could have contained either drugs or firearms).
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in finding that the search was within the scope
of Mr. Romero's consent.

III. CONCLUSION
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